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WORLD REVIEW is the only English monthly review giving an extensive selection of articles from publications all over the world. These articles are chosen with great care, since WORLD REVIEW can only be valuable as its sponsors want it to be, if it avoids all political bias. The Editor in his own article, and other signed contributors, express their opinions as frankly as they please. Otherwise the Review would lack force and colour. But the ultimate object of WORLD REVIEW is to perform a useful and progressive service by allowing

THE NATIONS TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

HOW WE FACED WAR

by VERNON BARTLETT

THESE notes are written in the middle of the worst crisis that has hit this poor crisis-bombarded world since the end of the war (formerly referred to as the "Great War" and now significantly enough more often as the "last war"). Day after day there are anxious crowds in Downing Street, and, so has authority relaxed under the pressure of events, even on the secret little grass square outside the Ambassadors' door of the Foreign Office, a square so neat and trim that I have never seen even a dog venture to walk on it.

The crowds, older Londoners tell me, remind them of the critical days of 1914. Of that I am no judge, for all I remember of the eve of the war is that I spent a glorious day fishing in a Hampshire stream and then bicycled home to Bournemouth to find a group of excited and happy people reading the latest bulletins scrawled up outside the local newspaper office. But I believe that there is a very important difference between the crowds of to-day and those of 1914. Some of the photographs show the crowds of to-day laughing and enthusiastic, but any crowd grins happily when it sees a press photographer. I have been through Downing Street a great deal in the past few weeks and I have seen no rejoicing. Instead there is a solemnity which has greatly impressed most

of the foreign newspaper correspondents whose job it is to gauge British opinion. And this solemnity is due less to memories of the last war—for most people in the crowds are young—than to a conviction that war is an absurdity and yet may be preferable to this everlasting crisis dependent on the whims of one man.

It is, of course, difficult to judge public opinion—or rather it is far too easy to pass hurried judgment based upon the stray comment of taxi drivers, lift boys, waitresses, policemen, charwomen and important-looking gentlemen in clubs—but to my mind the most significant development in Great Britain even before Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech is the growing realisation that peace is threatened not by the intolerance of the Czechs, not by the stubbornness of the French, not by the intrigues of a Colonel Beck in Poland or of a Count Ciano in Rome, but by the fact that a man who has had his way by thumping his fist on the table will go on adopting the same method until he is told as bluntly as possible that he must stop.

* * * *

I would scarcely have thought it possible that there could be so much cold anger against the policy of the German government and yet so little hostility toward the German people. That is the difference between 1914 and 1938—there is, here in London, at least so far as I can judge, a feeling of pity for the Germans in their present helplessness which is emphasised by one's own feeling that even in a democracy with a nice vote in the general elections, with the power to send letters to the press and with the right, if one wants to, to declaim one's opinions at the street corner, one can do so little to alter the course of events. These crowds in Downing Street are pathetically helpless rather than vulgar in their search for sensation. Even those of us who look much busier, who hurry from conferences in the Foreign Office to newspaper offices where sub-editors wait impatiently for front page copy, feel just as helpless. On the night of the Sudeten German ultimatum we were almost relieved—a machine was in motion which we could not control. Events were so much too big for us. At midnight I heard the tape machine ticking and hurried across the room to see the latest sensation. There was, I read, a "special correction" to a message about Max Baer and Tommy Farr. And I wondered if the news mattered even to Max Baer and Tommy Farr.

When the secret history of this crisis comes to be written, the most

amazing feature of it will be the number of Germans who have privately appealed to people in authority in this country to take the strongest possible line against their own Government that was compatible with justice. When one remembers the tradition of blind loyalty which used to inspire the German army—except for a short period after the war when social democracy was in power—one is amazed to hear that important officers appealed to the British government through one channel or another to warn Herr Hitler in the strongest possible language. The same appeal came even from prominent Nazi leaders whose admiration for much that the Fuehrer has done could not be questioned, but who realised the probability that their own country would be the worst sufferer among the Great Powers in the event of war. Or, at any rate, of war to-day.

* * * *

I used to argue, poor fool that I was, that the development of broadcasting would make war almost an impossibility. The malicious efforts of war propagandists would be nullified by the broadcasting of some sentimental song from an enemy music hall. It would be impossible, I believed, for anybody to work up that lunatic hatred which leads one to

BEAT THAT IF YOU CAN!
Mr. Chamberlain plays a friendly game with Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier in this composite photograph from "Marianne," Paris.

attribute the vilest motives and morals to everybody who happens to bear an enemy passport.

I listened to Herr Hitler's Nuremberg speech in a pleasant room overlooking the quiet squares of Lincoln's Inn. Around me were books by great men who are now banned in Germany because they were Jews, gramophone records which could bring to one music written by men in moments of highest inspiration, but which may no more be heard by citizens in Germany, unless perhaps as the works of unknown composers. Surely, I said to myself, it was impossible that we in Great Britain could ever again suffer from the same intolerance. And then through the loud speaker came the hoarse shouts of a man who is desperately sincere in his hatred, and as I listened to the deliberate appeal to the worst prejudices of the mob I felt my own anger rising, and I in turn was ready to stand up and rant against National-Socialism as Herr Hitler was ranting against democracy. It is not perhaps surprising that the B.B.C. no longer uses as its motto: "Nation shall speak peace unto nation."

You who listened to the broadcast of that speech should not forget that it came as the climax of a week of carefully prepared mass hysteria. The reaction elsewhere in Germany was, I am told, quite different. There was no enthusiasm for all this talk of military might, and not over-much sympathy for the Sudeten Germans who, after all, have never been governed from Berlin and who are divided from Germany by one of the oldest-established and most mountainous frontiers in Europe. The German who used to feel some relationship with the Austrian from Graz or Linz or Innsbruck feels very little with the Sudeten from Eger or Aussig or Reichenberg. And the same German is very much more interested in peace than in plebiscites.

But one cannot estimate with any assurance the time it would take for this latent opposition to take effect. One can only say it would take longer than one would expect. For there again broadcasting could be expected to work up for a Germany fighting for her life an incomparably greater will to resist than could be aroused for a campaign against the Czechs. Perhaps in three or four months a people whose nerves (and, in many cases, whose physical health) has already been overstrained in time of peace would begin to show signs of disintegration. In estimating Germany's strength one should never forget that at the last genuine elections, in November, 1932, there were more Socialist and Communist voters than National Socialist ones.

This means that, if we have to talk of war with Germany we should concentrate on a war of ideas in the conviction that, if our conception of freedom is a good one, it will convince and prevail.

In the last war the part played by propaganda, especially when weariness had set in, cannot be exaggerated. But to some extent the German people would be weary before the next war began. They have drilled and marched and shouted and waved flags until even the less intelligent of them are beginning to get a little bored,

If it were possible to run a war without generals, one would not drop bombs over German towns and villages but millions upon millions of leaflets. If only one in a thousand were read it would probably be far more effective in creating a desire for peace than would a bomb which causes almost as much anger as terror. And the efforts of the Gestapo to collect and destroy the other nine hundred and ninety nine would certainly not increase confidence in the rightness of Germany's cause.

Each time I cross the room to the "ticker" to see the latest item of news on the tape machine I have a second of fear lest it should announce

THE STAR TURN FROM NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S "GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH."

John Groth, "New Masses," New York

to me the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or the bombing of Prague, and that leads on to a sense of amazement that the people in this country, fatalistic though they be about war, are worrying so little about self-defence. We spend a million pounds a day on the preparation of armaments, which are of course in themselves the most necessary defence of all. But we spend practically nothing upon propaganda, upon the preparation of a national register to prevent the most appalling muddles during an emergency, and even upon air raid precautions.

Leaders Without Imagination

The public, one is told, is not interested and it is true that the ordinary man shrugs his shoulders and says: "What's the good of it all?" Is that senile cynicism, the gesture of a people too tired to defend itself? I don't believe it. I believe that the whole trouble is the lack of imaginative leadership. In China, in Abyssinia, in Spain, and now perhaps in Central Europe, our political leaders have made the unforgivable blunder, much more common to democracies than it ought to be, of forgetting that life without ideals is as little invigorating as food without salt. During the last decade public opinion on several occasions has risen to heights of generosity and self-abnegation which were magnificent and inspiring and on each occasion the governments have suddenly capitulated to fear. Of the four men who have met day after day in Downing Street to discuss our fate, one was responsible for sacking the most popular Foreign Secretary we have had since the war; another was responsible for the betrayal of the League in Manchuria and another was one of the signatories of the Hoare-Laval report. One has the deepest sympathy for any man called upon to bear the responsibility of deciding between peace and war, courage and cowardice on behalf not of himself alone, but of a whole great nation. And yet one cannot wonder that under such doubtful leadership there is an apathy which suggests to the foreigner that the British Empire is hopelessly decadent. We want no Fascism here, but we want discipline. We want no dictatorship, but we want leaders. There is an odd etiquette in Fleet Street that one paper very seldom refers to another by name, even when it wants to slang it. I dislike etiquette and I am glad to pay tribute to an article by W. Horsfall Carter in the *Fortnightly Review*. Horsfall Carter in "Reconnaissance on the Home Front" in the July number of the *Fortnightly Review* shows up, as no writer I have read has done, the danger of drifting on in the

same old way and the importance of much more vigorous and imaginative leadership in the democracies if they are to resist the brutal but vigorous assault of the totalitarian states.

I foresee a rapid development of that indirect censorship in which the British excel, in order to preserve the reputations of the men who failed to have munitions on our warships when we might have checked the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the destruction of the League; who failed to take *any one* of the obviously essential measures to prevent appalling casualties and loss of life should this country be dragged into war, who failed to warn Germany in unequivocable terms that we consider our conception of justice worth fighting for.

The *Fortnightly Review* may be our competitor on the bookstalls; it is certainly our colleague in its efforts to persuade the British to shake of their apathy.

Postscript

Twenty-four hours after Mr. Chamberlain had been discussing war measures against Germany I saw him on the aerodrome at Munich on his journey to Berchtesgaden. Cheering Germans stood on chairs to see this British Prime Minister who had taken so dramatic a step in the hope of saving peace, and the Union Jack (borrowed at the last moment from the British Consulate General), fluttered side by side with the German flag. There he was, with his old fashioned "butterfly" collar and his umbrella, on the strangest mission ever undertaken by a British statesman.

A wise step? One cannot yet tell. To some, the journey all the way to Berchtesgaden seemed a little too reminiscent of a journey by a German king to Canossa. The latest reports as I write would seem to indicate that this will prove to be all too accurate an interpretation.

FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY

Venezuela Government are to close the list of Gomez claimants. Juan Gomez, celebrated Dictator of that country, died in 1935, leaving a fortune of £6,000,000. He had the reputation of being more times a father, grandfather and great-grandfather than even King Augustus, who died in 1733 leaving 354 children by his 700 mistresses. There have been 7287 persons registering claims to a share in the Gomez fortune, of which the Government have recognised 4,300 as being well founded. Government propose to meet the claims by issuing Venezuelan bonds, but financial experts warn them that to put such a large sum into sudden circulation will cause inflation and raise the level of prices.—*"Evening Standard," London.*

PARIS STILL LAUGHED

"Marianne"

"Il faut conserver son sangfroid."
"Froid ou pas froid, je tiens en effet à le conserver! . . ."

"Marianne"

"No, I don't believe there'll be a war, but if a nice little absorption of excess population started, it wouldn't surprise me at all."



IN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES

"And here is my movable signpost for frontier incidents as desired."

"Le Canard Enchainé"



"L'Ordre"

"Do you know Chamberlain is meeting Hitler?"
"No, is he? In how many rounds?"



"Marianne"

"It appears that in the event of war we shall travel in the passenger compartments."

FOREIGN BODIES

by SPOTLIGHT

All the world likes to read gossip about other people. The human eccentricities that lurk behind the imposing figures officially presented to the world are seldom known; these personal notes aim at giving flesh and blood to the men whose names appear so often in our articles.

TO write, in the middle of September, for readers who will read your words at the beginning of October is not easy in this year of grace, for who would care, in 1938, to prophesy three weeks ahead?

If you put down all the facts on paper and soberly add them up, the answer is war. The process which began with the tearing up of treaties and high-speed rearmament has reached the point where it, the irresistible force, encounters an immovable object, a small nation recently liberated and resolved to fight in defence of its freedom. The process—so the paper sum of the facts seems to say—has now reached that stage where no more cheap swoops are to be had and where, logically, the enormous fighting machine that has been created comes into action to ensure the continued success of the process.

And yet! Either my sub-conscious, as the Americans say, refuses to face up to the distasteful inevitable, or I have a hunch that there will be no war—yet. I can't see why, and the answer to that sum is impregnable; I have totted it up a dozen times, and it always comes out the same. But, somehow, in spite of everything, at this writing—as the Americans say again—I have a feeling that we are going to skid by war once more, for the present.

What has happened in these fateful weeks, that have seen foreigners in Berlin and Prague and Budapest and Warsaw packing their bags, sending their women and children home, getting their passports visæd, making all the preparations they can for a quick getaway?

How it has all recalled 1914! Then you had a set of rulers and statesmen and politicians, many of whose names are now almost forgotten, confabulating and exchanging notes and sending ultimatums and giving warnings, and at the end of it all came the lunatic war, that seems twenty years later to have bequeathed new virility only to the vanquished German Reich, now mightier than ever. Now, in 1938, you have another group of figures in the spotlight, saying and doing the same things. You have not war—yet. Perhaps they have learned.

Our Strong Man in Berlin

One of the busiest of these spotlit figures, in these recent weeks, has been Sir Nevile Henderson. He is strong-willed, a bachelor, a martinet. He does not sink his personality in his calling, as do most diplomats. He liked Alexander of Yugoslavia, who had such confidence in him that Henderson was jocularly known to the Serbs as the uncrowned king of their country when he was in Belgrade, and he thus gained the reputation of being privately in sympathy with the methods of the King's dictatorship. Inevitably, this reputation followed him to Berlin, where in a speech soon after his arrival he enjoined Englishmen to study with more sympathy and understanding the "great social experiment of National-Socialism."

The great social experiment has been keeping Sir Nevile busy these days. British statesmen and diplomats, in 1938, are inevitably anxious to avoid the reproach that was made against their predecessors of 1914—that they were too irresolute, and left the Germans in doubt about England's attitude. Sir Nevile must have seen the spectre of that reproach loom big before him at the end of August, when he learned that Hitler's Foreign Minister, the bellicose von Ribbentrop, was unshakeably convinced that England would in no circumstances intervene in a war arising out of the Czechoslovak dispute. Sir Nevile urgently sent word to von Ribbentrop that to assume so much was to be gravely wrong. But in London the anxious question was asked, when Sir Nevile's telegrams came in, "Does Hitler make his decisions on the strength of von Ribbentrop's advice? Is he informed about the real state of British opinion?"

Ribbentrop—Saviour of Peace?

The awful spectre of 1914, in fact, stalked the corridors of the Foreign Office, and this is why Henderson was sent to Nuremberg with instructions to try and see Hitler himself. He failed; and this, again, was why, on the eve of Hitler's great speech, the British Government sent for the representatives of the world's newspapers and made that long statement, designed to remove from Hitler's mind any doubt there may have been there that an attack on Czechoslovakia would bring England into the field against Germany. A dramatic moment. Possibly von Ribbentrop, the main exponent of the "lightning war" theory, saved the peace by his inadroitness in this moment.

Another man in the spotlight is Milan Hodza, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, of whom you hear relatively little, because he is overshadowed by his President, Eduard Benes. But Hodza is an interesting figure, the human embodiment of these problems of Danubian Europe which caused the last war and have brought us so near to the next one. He is a man of parts: he can talk to you in English, French or German, when he goes to Yugoslavia to meet Little Entente friends he converses with them in Serbian, and once, a pleasant gesture of goodwill which much annoyed the Hungarians, who detest politeness from Czechoslovaks, he made a speech in Hungarian in unveiling a monument to a Hungarian poet in one of the Hungarian minority districts.

Pre-War Reformer

In Hodza's career the wheel of Danubian problems has turned full circle. Before the war, when Czechoslovak independence seemed but a roseate dream, he was a lonely Slovak deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, and he was a good friend of that Archduke Franz Ferdinand whose assassination at Serajevo in 1914 led to the World War. Franz Ferdinand saw that the Austro-Hungarian Empire would collapse unless the nations

"La Lumière" *Paris*

"To start with, Germany is not ready for war."

"Huh! She doesn't look as if she were ready for peace either!"

"Marianne" *Paris*

KARLSBAD FOR SLIMMING

One of the real reasons for the German claim to the Sudetenland.

living within it were given some measure of self-government and proposed, when he came to the throne, to try and make such reforms. This was the basis of his friendship with Hodza, who loved Vienna and at that time never thought of anything more than Czechoslovak home-rule within it. Franz Ferdinand, incidentally, was detested by many people in Vienna and Budapest precisely because he had such plans. Now he has been dead these 24 years and Hodza, as Prime Minister of the young Republic, is once more grappling with the many-headed monster of Danubian politics—the eternal drive of the Germanic family towards domination in Danubia and the eternal resistance to this of the smaller nations that lies in its path.

Admiral on Stormy Seas

A little further down the Danube the spotlight picks up another figure—Miklós Horthy. The last commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy, he still wears his admiral's uniform; in the 19 years that he has been regent of Hungary he has only twice seen the sea—once as Mussolini's guest at Venice, once as Hitler's guest at Kiel. He, too, has lived through many changes. As Franz Josef's naval aide-de-camp he knew the great balls and banquets at Schönbrunn; and as Regent of Hungary he twice expelled by force of arms Franz Josef's successor, the last Emperor Karl, when he tried to regain his Hungarian throne. In 1937 Horthy sat in the Imperial Box of the Vienna Opera as the honoured guest of Miklas and Schuschnigg; and in 1938, on his way to Kiel and Hitler, he was greeted in that same Vienna, where Schuschnigg now lies in captivity, by the upraised arm of Seyss-Inquart.

Nineteen years have passed since Horthy rode into Budapest, from which the Rumanians had cleared the Reds, at the head of the Hungarian national armies. He is hale and should live another fifteen years. What will be Hungary's place in Danubia by then, now that she is irrevocably linked to that great Reich which has declared the claimant to the Hungarian throne, for which Horthy is Regent, to be a criminal?

CAN IT BE GOERING?

Foreign notability contemplating domicile in England will shortly be in the market to purchase an important country Estate with a large house and good sporting facilities. Price not first consideration—probably up to a quarter of a million pounds available for right place—but must be really first-class property in every way.—*Advertisement in the "Times."*

THE OPEN FORUM

AMERICA AND EUROPE'S CRISIS

Isolationists and Anti-Fascists

by RAYMOND GRAM SWING

In this section we publish, without necessarily sharing the views they express, articles from men of international fame. Millions of listeners know and admire Mr. Swing as the man who, in fifteen minutes each week, gives them an extraordinary vivid and balanced account of current American events. In this analysis of his country's attitude towards the European crisis, our readers will find the qualities which make him one of the best broadcasters the B.B.C. has had the good fortune to secure

NO democratic country in the world is so anti-fascist as the United States, though whether this is so much repugnance as fear is a difficult question to answer. If it is repugnance it would influence American foreign policy strongly. If it is fear of a trend toward fascism at home, it would be a less potent factor in foreign affairs. But it is fair to say that the usually disunited Americans are overwhelmingly hostile to Hitler and Mussolini. They speak and write against them and their works with passion and bitterness.

But no country feels more secure. Isolationism, of course, rises from this sense of safety. Unless American interests are palpably affected by world events, the instinctive desire of the country is to behave in a way to remain safe, which means to avoid conflict. So the usually disunited Americans are also overwhelmingly in favour of remaining aloof from the present dangers of Europe.

These two generalisations, that Americans are anti-fascist, and that they are isolationist, are probably the only ones that can be made about American opinion as to European affairs. Obviously the two generalisations contradict each other. If Europe goes to war in the near future,

the fascists will be on one side and the democracies on the other. American sympathies then will be with the democracies. And that would go against the strong tide of isolationist feeling. There will be a conflict within the American mind. Anyone who pretends to know how this conflict would work itself out has unusual prophetic power. Less gifted prophets can only study the two currents of feeling, and this study leads to almost infinite ramifications.

Creed of the Isolationists

To say, simply, that America is isolationist is to misrepresent a complex tangle of feelings, some isolationist, some pacifist. American isolationists of the true blood are anti-foreign, and they are not fundamentally anti-war. They would fight America's battles willingly. What they refuse to do is to fight the battles of other countries. They are against collective security, which they think is the effort of foreigners to induce America to fight and pay for their selfish aims. They do not speak the language of international law. They believe that the only guarantee of peace is to be so mighty that no other country will dare to violate American rights. Hence they make a cult of indifference to right and wrong in other nations' quarrels. Their one objective is to keep America out of a foreigners' war, so they must refuse to take sides on the moral questions which lead to wars.

This brings the isolationists to a chronic distrust of all foreign policies. Rather than to appear indifferent to right and wrong, they find wrong in everything. They represented the British efforts to curb Italy in Abyssinia through the League as a mere service of British imperial interests. They regard every approach to joint Anglo-American action in the Far East as an intrigue which will end in the United States pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. They can say, with some truth, that the League of Nations has never been sincerely used, and that there is imperialism behind the conduct of the European democracies as well as the dictators.

To the isolationists the great crime in modern American history was coming into the world war. They picture this as an act of idealism which ended in the most disastrous and unidealistic peace. It cost an enormous expenditure on America's part in the war, and then the bulk of the loans to the Allies. Not only that, America was not thanked for the loans, but was excoriated for dreaming of collecting them.

The isolationists dominated the Munitions Senate Inquiry, which was arranged to prove that America entered the war for economic reasons, since it committed its own prosperity to the victory of the Allies. So they passed the neutrality legislation which would make it possible to forbid Americans to have business dealings with future belligerents. The years have been well used to build up a thesis, a simple, documented thesis, intelligible to every child, and nearly every child in America understands it. Isolationism is not in the least idealistic. It is hard-boiled and vigorously selfish. And it is intensely patriotic.

Pacifist Allies

The pacifists, neither hard-boiled nor patriotic, have allied themselves with the isolationists. They did so during the Senate munitions investigation, and in the campaign for the neutrality legislation. This is, no doubt, a very strange alliance, and a few genuine pacifists are aware of its incongruity and immorality. But they believed that this was a way to stay out of war. They went into the partnership hesitantly, perhaps fearing their own deterioration. It certainly has set in. For by now some pacifist organisations are issuing public statements to say that Czechoslovakia is an "artificial" state, and they infer that no damage can come to the world if Hitler has his way with the Sudeten Germans. They become in effect apologists for the fascists. And that maintains an

"And now thank God for the Atlantic Ocean."

"New Masses," New York

identity of outlook with the isolationists who favour a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia, simply because it sounds like a democratic solution, and will destroy any possible pretext for the United States to take an interest in the affair.

But the desire to stay out of war in the United States is not restricted to isolationists and pacifists. A substantial, if minority, element in America still believes in international co-operation, and in America bearing its responsibility for world peace. And this element also would wish to stay out of a European war to-day. It would not look upon a war in defence of Czechoslovakia as a war of collective security, but as one fought in defence of France first of all, and of Britain in so far as its security depends on France.

It is this body of thought in America, intensely interested in foreign affairs, well aware of America's membership in the world, which in time will determine American action. The isolationists and pacifists are alike dogmatists, but they are not realistic, and will not count in the end. It is the informed Americans who will lead. For the present they certainly would not advocate America's coming at once into a European war over Czechoslovakia or over anything else. If the war is fought now they will want to revise the neutrality legislation so that America could help in a limited way with resources and manufactures. Greater American participation would not be regarded necessary, until it became clear that the democracies were unable to win without it. One could expect the same slow development as in the World War, and the same ultimate decision. America would come into a war in which it felt its national interest at stake. If it had to choose between living in a world in which the democracies or the fascists were victorious it would choose the democracies. In 1917 it had to choose between a victory of the Allies or the Central Powers. The choice to-day would be different both as to names and ideas, but it would be similar.

Upholders of Law and Order

What makes for confusion in appraising American opinion is that this body of informed American thought is still in the minority, and expresses itself more quietly than the isolationists and the pacifists. Its leaders are President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. But that does not mean that it is a party doctrine, for there are as many Democratic isolationists as Republican, and the believers in co-operation are on both sides of the party fence.

The President and the Secretary of State, as spokesmen of this informed minority, do not use a single voice. Mr. Roosevelt is inclined to be more emphatic and impulsive than Mr. Hull. In his Chicago "quarantine" speech he went further than the State Department would have liked. In his Kingston speech, promising to defend Canada, he was a shade more precise than the State Department wished. But their objective is the same. Mr. Hull wants a world of law and order. He wants the observance of treaties. He wants a family of nations aware of their inter-dependence. He is more tedious in expressing himself, and far more cautious. He is willing to take a step at a time, which is not the Roosevelt temperament. But he is taking the steps. If one studies his utterances one will find that each time he sums up the underlying principles of American foreign policy he adds a phrase, until now the frame-work is nearly full. The British reader will not find in it a pledge to leap to the aid of Britain. Nor is that what Mr. Hull cares about it. But he will find in it an affirmation of a world in which the Briton and the Briton's view of society would be safe.

Mr. Hull always speaks about co-operation but never about agreements to co-operate. He knows his public. He must avoid the outcry that America is being led down the garden path by the British, which is what an agreement with Britain would look like. He is wise enough to appreciate that true co-operation is an act of the spirit, and comes from better understanding, warmer sympathies, and more open collaboration in non-political fields. It is that whether a treaty has been signed or not.

What has made it harder for the Roosevelt-Hull school to speak persuasively is that it is in the non-political fields that Britain has found it hard to collaborate. The trade agreement has taken a dangerously long time for consummation. The debt question has been allowed to fester until now it is late to raise it at all. And British speakers quoted in America seem to be eager for the promise of help for *Britain* when Americans would respond only to an appeal to support certain principles which Britain has not energetically supported.

Mr. Chamberlain Has Not Helped

I should have said that a month or two ago Anglo-American relations were at about as low an ebb as at any time since 1920. Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy, perhaps unjustly, won him few friends in

America. Being anti-fascist, the Americans did not like the spectacle of reconciliation between British democracy and Italian fascism, elements which from their perspective are not reconcilable. The indifference to Spain, as part of the deal with Mussolini, really helped turn non-Catholic Americans to the Loyalist cause. At the outset of the Spanish war the Americans had been, if anything, pro-rebel. They began changing their minds when they saw the open participation of the fascists. They were confirmed in their new opinion when they saw that Spain was a pawn in an arrangement between Chamberlain and Mussolini.

The movement to lift the embargo against Spain (under the new neutrality legislation) actually reached the point when it might have been carried in the Senate if President Roosevelt had not felt obliged to stop it. The whole case for lifting the embargo was this: It had been applied originally as an effort to stop the civil war, and Britain was "non-intervening" in the same way. But Italy had refused to "non-intervene," and Britain was making a deal with Italy. So the American embargo became a part of the British intrigue with Italy. The isolationists who took this stand, like Senator Nye, chairman of the Senate Munitions Investigation, were not so much pro-Loyalist as they were anti-British. They appealed to their colleagues to pull America out of the position of playing imperial British politics. Mr. Roosevelt personally favoured lifting the embargo for better reasons. But he could not be carried to the point of doing what he would have been pleased to do, if it poked a stick in the wheel of Mr. Chamberlain's policy.

The anti-British sentiment in America is not as strong as in the days of the Black and Tans. But it remains as a factor always useful for any special purpose. Americans are now more friendly to the Spanish government, thanks to Mr. Chamberlain. They also are (for a while) more friendly to the government of Cardenas in Mexico because the British withdrew their ambassador—over a question of debt payment. It would be no doubt foolish to exaggerate the anti-British feeling, for it is much like the feeling between brothers, harder to keep pleasant than between mere friends. But it would be as foolish to ignore it. Not until a substantial trade agreement has been made, and not until the debt question has been settled, can Britain expect more favourable reactions from Americans. One might also say that not until Britain perseveres in a consistent, clear foreign policy against *all* aggression can it hope to receive American help in fighting some particular aggression which arouses Britain unless America should be similarly aroused.

But behind whatever antagonism or pique may be felt in America toward Britain lies a big fact. The British dominions and empire mean much to America. Americans are not always aware of it. But they would become acutely aware of it if they saw that the British world might pass into the keeping of another ideology. Dorothy Thompson, one of America's most vigorous political writers, is sure America would enter a war the moment London was bombed. I am not of this opinion. But I share her view that America would fight to prevent the British Empire falling into fascist hands or under fascist influence. I agree when she says that we should then fight so that the British would continue to bear their present responsibilities—and that these responsibilities should not fall to America. For in that statement speaks true national interest. And until a world of collective security has been established, true national interest must be the one guide of foreign policy.

BLOOD AND RENT

The author (Miss Elim Anderson) is aware that "particularly since the economic and political uncertainty of recent years, consciousness of class is coming to be more important than consciousness of 'race' as such." She cites the pertinent comment of one Irishman who said that "there's damn little fat in thinking you're better than an Eyetalian if neither of you can pay the rent."—*"New Masses," New York.*

GOODWILL AT INTERNATIONAL HOUSE

An official of the University of Chicago's International House was recently asked whether foreign crises were making a serious impact on the house. "Yes," he replied, "and last Christmas Day was the best example. On that day a Russian resident received word that his brother had been shot in the purge, the German residents demanded a separate room for their Christmas dinner because they didn't want to eat with Jews, a Spaniard insisted on moving to another floor because a pro-Franco student was in the next room, and the Japanese and Chinese kept smiling at each other so politely that I knew a blow-up was coming."—*"Japan Chronicle," Kobe.*

PARIS: "GERMANIC CITY"

In his new book *The Struggle for Power,* Herr Alfred Rosenberg writes:

"That magnificent old Paris, where, in the middle ages Flemish was spoken more than French, was as Germano-Gothic as Normandy or Frisia, until this city, too, was inundated by Jews, by Southern bastards, Romans, etc., and lost her character just as ancient Rome had done. It is only in Brittany and Normandy that France still possesses sources of Nordic strength."—*"L'Ere Nouvelle," Paris.*

WILL YOU, WON'T YOU?

"There is reason to suspect that both Great Britain and France were preparing to bring yet more pressure on the Czechs. This is behind the French suggestion that Lord Runciman should be asked to produce yet another plan."— Vernon Bartlett, *"News Chronicle,"* 15th September.

"Will you give a little farther?" said his lordship to the Czechs,
"There's a gentleman behind us I should really hate to vex,
"I have taken on a mission to maintain the open door,
"So to prove co-operation will you give a little more?
"Will you, won't you, will you, won't you give a little more?

"I shall use to your advantage every token of goodwill,
"So do your part by giving way a little farther still,"
Then said the Czechs, "Our formulas already number four."
And they thanked his lordship kindly but could not give any more,
Could not, would not, could not, would not give a little more.

His lordship said, "You've no idea how lovely it would be,
"If you'd just give way completely and leave all the rest to me;
"The fruitful paths of compromise I would again explore,
"As a purely private person, if you gave a little more?"
"Will you, won't you, will you, won't you give a little more?"

The Czechs said mediation would be greatly simplified,
If concessions were requested in a quarter still untried,
His lordship answered that this view he must indeed deplore,
If they found themselves unable to concede a little more—
If they would not, could not, would not, could not give a little more.

He pointed out how steadily and surely they'd advance,
Secure in the assurances of Britain and of France,
But they answered in a strain that shocked his lordship to the core,
That they feared non-intervention if they gave a little more—
So would not, could not, would not, could not give a little more.

REYNARD.

2

WAYS
WITH A
KNOT

Self-determination
does the trick.

"Kladderadatsch"
Berlin

THE
MOSCOW
VENTRILO-
QUIST

"Il Travaso
delle Idee,"
Rome

"Saturday Evening Post"

"Hello, Czechoslovakia, are you still there?"

DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES

FRANCE RATS TOO

From the "Narodni Osvobozeni," Prague, 16.9.38

We go to press this month at a moment which cannot be less than a decisive turning-point in history. The complete surrender of the French and British Governments in the face of Herr Hitler's ultimatum has staggered the world, which is still only just waking up to its vital importance. When the following extracts were printed, the first inklings of what was to come were only just becoming apparent. In our next issue we hope to do more justice to this fateful event

THE news has come that France, too, is beginning to wonder whether, under the slogan of self-determination, Czechoslovakia might not be advised to refrain from defending her frontiers—those frontiers which after the World War were recognised and confirmed, thanks to France.

We know that it is a fact that there are circles both on the Right and Left in France who doubt the policy followed by Briand, Poincaré and Foch with Masaryk and Benes. The reasons should, therefore, be

recapitulated, which led France to acknowledge Masaryk's programme for the new Europe as right. France and the rest of the allies recognised at that time that they must establish and maintain a Central European Front. They recognised that lasting peace can be built up upon and with those who sincerely wish for peace. Has anything happened in the meantime to alter this truth?

Even at that time the policy of Masaryk, Briand and Wilson was opposed. In the name of peace, attempts were made to save Austria-Hungary. As we were determined to defend our national existence, we were represented as being *saboteurs* of peace. We were victorious nevertheless, and events proved us right. But the old doubts are cropping up with new dangers. In France and England there are some who would like to save peace by taking a path which would lead certainly to war.

BASIS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

From the "Ceske Slovo," Prague, 16.9.38

CHAMBERLAIN several times acknowledged the truth and justice of our cause. He knows that it is not a matter of Czechoslovakia, but of world peace, of truth and morality, the maintenance of which is the basis of the British Empire.

For us, there is no other path to follow than that which we have trodden for twenty years. The frontiers of the Republic are inviolable and sacred. We shall give way before no power, whether presented to us in the form of a plebiscite or otherwise. Our nerves will not break down. We are united and firm. And we know that peace for Czechoslovakia means the peace of Europe.

THE FIASCO

From the "Lidove Listy," Prague, 16.9.38

WE gave way in the proposals we made to the Henlein Party only to prove to the whole world, and our allies in particular, that we bear no guilt should peace be destroyed, and that we were ready to make even the greatest sacrifices in the interests of peace. The final result of this policy, however, is a complete fiasco.

We have given way so far that the entire world has recognised one of the greatest sacrifices to peace ever made; and still this policy has not borne the fruit which our allies promised themselves from it. The situation has on the contrary worsened, Germany has interpreted our conciliation as weakness—and, furthermore, the Czechoslovak public is a prey to unrest and doubt as to whether this procedure was the right one. . . . Further steps along this same line would not only weaken us internationally, but might shatter us internally.

TO CANOSSA

From "L'Humanité," (Communist), Paris, 15.9.38

"MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN is going to Berchtesgaden!" When this terrifying news was telephoned to us, we could not bring ourselves to believe it. The news, however, is true.

The air was still resounding with Hermann Goering's insults to Britain, "protector of the Jews," when His Majesty's Prime Minister in the United Kingdom went to wait in the ante-chamber of the Führer's private residence—just as Schuschnigg did!

Terrifying step! We can imagine the glamour with which this news will crown the Chancellor of the Reich, who has proclaimed himself the envoy of divine Providence and successor of the masters of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. Tonight's broadcast music programmes were interrupted in Germany in order to announce the homage that the head of the greatest Empire in the world was going to render to the Reich of the swastika.

Were one to want to exalt the war-lord's megalomania, his spectacular taste for power, were one to want to galvanise still further life into Nazi Germany, one could have done nothing better.

All the news during the last five days has confirmed that official Germany feared the consequences of a warlike enterprise. This fear was a factor for peace. What should have been done was to make it more precise, to leave no doubt, to assure the aggressor ten times a day, every day, that he could not count upon impunity.

The nations were clinging to this hope of peace. Mr. Chamberlain has set the gears in reverse. He did not warn Germany; he is ringing the front door bell at Berchtesgaden instead. He did not say: "Further adventures prohibited!" He is begging: "Allow me to hear your

demands. Don't put yourself out to inform me of them. Permit me to make, by aeroplane, the journey to the Bavarian Canossa!"

Oh! I know the answer! We shall be told: "Peace is worth more than pride. If it was necessary to go to Berchtesgaden to save peace, let us praise the man who accepted this humiliating pilgrimage."

But no! It is not peace that will be saved at Berchtesgaden! Peace is inseparable from the security of Czechoslovakia, and it is its sacrifice which the Prime Minister has gone to arrange.

ANY NEUTRALS? YES, PLEASE!

From "Le Canard Enchainé," Paris, 14.9.38

This famous French satirical weekly has helped its readers a lot in the past weeks to maintain their good humour and nerve

AMONG the different proposals being considered in the endeavour to find a solution to the Czechoslovak problem, neutrality has been mentioned.

A federal and neutral Czechoslovakian state might be constituted.

It seems that this plan could not be accepted.

This may be regretted. But it is not for us to know the reasons which caused it to be rejected.

AT THE MANŒUVRES

"What's the corporal as a civilian?"

"Teacher of the Lambeth Walk."



"Le Canard Enchainé," Paris

Nevertheless this plan seems to us too full of good sense to be completely abandoned. And if others reject all idea of neutrality, we for our part are ready to answer the question:

"Any neutrals?" "Yes, please, us!"

In fact, since so many countries are benefiting from neutrality, we think that now it is France's turn.

As eminent statesmen have said in admirable speeches, France has proved her worth on all the battlefields and her army has always distinguished itself by its courage. Everyone knows that we fear nothing.

A change might not be out of place.

We ought now to find out if we are as great, as magnificent, in neutrality as in war.

It is worth trying.

And for our part we are ready to accept without fuss a neutrality rejected by others. With, of course the guarantee of England, the United States, Italy and Germany; these gentlemen, naturally, reserving the right to fight for us, if, some day, they think our neutrality to be in danger.

HOME TO THE REICH!
Chamberlain's Task

From the "Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten," 16.9.38

A noble rivalry between London and Paris has broken out in some sections of the Press over the question of who moved the English Prime Minister to his bold decision to seek out Germany's Führer in the heart of his country, in order to discuss directly with him the maintenance of peace and the solution of the European crisis. This rivalry is certainly praiseworthy, but it is of no importance in comparison with the deed itself, in comparison with the power of decision which the English Prime Minister has brought to light. If we on the German side wanted to join in this Anglo-French race to claim priority in the idea, we would not be without prospect of coming in first. For, after all, the method which Chamberlain has adopted is that which has always been preferred and recommended by the Führer—that of bi-lateral negotiations, of sincere speech between man and man.

It is in Anglo-German relations particularly that this method of negotiation and solution of problems can claim a noteworthy success; the Naval Agreement, after all, was born without the assistance of an international conference and only by conversations between the two parties. How strong the impression of this method has been with Chamberlain, he himself testified not long ago in the House of Commons, when he advised his fellow-countrymen to appreciate the significance of the Naval Agreement more strongly than up to the present. The Führer and the German people, therefore, welcome with great satisfaction the fact that Chamberlain through his visit to the Obersalzberg has again turned to this method of negotiation, and that he put his happy thought at once into practice.

The English Prime Minister is accompanied by the sincere and heartiest wishes of all men, without difference of nationality, who are working not only for peace in itself but also for the idea of justice and honour in the life of nations. True, the mere fact of the political flight from London to the Obersalzberg is a deed, but it alone does not suffice to assure the final fulfilment of these hopes. Chamberlain's journey comes at a point in the development of Europe and of the problem of Czechoslovakia in which there can no longer be any fundamental differences of opinion about the kernel of all questions. In the last few days particularly a far-reaching clarification has taken place which offers hope of a peaceful solution.

No less than the head of the Italian Government, Benito Mussolini, has placed himself at the head of fighters for a sensible, natural and just decision, by his open letter to Lord Runciman. With the full force



"Le Canard Enchainé," *Paris*

UNDER GRETCHEN'S PLAITS

of his powerful personality the Duce assumes leadership of the friends of a just peace outside of Germany. In clear and forceful language he hammers it into the world how the Czechoslovak State is to be regarded and how it is to be handled to the advantage of European welfare and peace. With the plainness of content and monumental power of form which characterise him, Mussolini points out the internal contradictions which have for twenty years afflicted the artificial construction of the so-called Czechoslovak State. With ruthless decisiveness he draws his conclusion for a settlement which would be no compromise, but a clear-cut separation in accordance with the principles of common-sense and justice.

The Duce makes the sensible solution that the nationalities out of which the "State" bearing the name of Czechoslovakia is thrown together, should be joined to their brother nations and that the National State of the Czechs should then be granted entry into the European group of States. Mussolini also recommends as an instrument of this constructive operation a plebiscite of the nationalities in the spirit of the right of self-determination, for which the democracies are supposed to have fought in the world war, and which Adolf Hitler from inmost conviction of honour and duty made his demand, and that of the German people, in his Congress speech.

Ink v. Blood

Such frontiers drawn in accordance with nationality would no longer be drawn with ink, to use Mussolini's words—they would be fixed in accordance with the blood of human beings and so drawn by the hand of God who has created differences between blood and blood. It was an outrage against the idea of national self-determination which was committed at Versailles with the ink of hate and revenge, when they sought to force contrasting blood-streams into the same channel and thought they could make a majority of nationalities bow beneath the yoke of the Czech minority for all time. In the Führer's speech, with its unequivocal demand for the right of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, as well as in Mussolini's letter to Runciman, the problem has been given clear outlines. Should there still exist any doubt in the mind of the world, how the Sudeten Germans themselves interpret their right of self-determination, and how they picture its practical realisation, the last remnant of vagueness will be removed by the deeply

moving proclamation of Konrad Henlein: freedom, peace and work for the German men and women who are still chained to the Czechoslovak monstrosity and who are striving with every fibre of their national consciousness and every drop of their German blood to free themselves from it. Home to the Reich! That is the banner of liberation which Konrad Henlein has unfurled in the decisive hour on the Obersalzberg; that is at the same time the only path which can lead to a lasting solution.

There is no longer either time or possibility for any compromising efforts, which would ban 3,500,000 Sudeten Germans to live within the frontiers of the Nationality-State of Czechoslovakia, however their autonomy were constituted. The Czech holders of power, who even a few weeks ago might have had some prospect of maintaining, at least outwardly, their patchwork State by the introduction of autonomy, have gambled away their chance. Konrad Henlein's proclamation cuts the table in half between Germans and Czechs and gives the other nationalities the password to follow the example of the Germans and decide the course of their national fate with their own strength and will.

May our guest from England, whom Adolf Hitler is welcoming to the conference table in the Berghof, understand the sign of the times, and may he find the strength to help the Führer of the Germans to a solution which will breathe the spirit of peace and of national justice.

SOCIETY NOTE

Some venturesome people, undeterred by the war, are holiday-making in Spain this month.

Lady Constance Milnes-Gaskell went off to North-West Spain with a party of friends immediately her period of "in-waiting" to Queen Mary was concluded.

She has visited cathedrals at Burgos and other towns and is doing a round of sight-seeing, including Guernica.

Lady Constance's daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mr. Lewis Motley, live in a lovely Wren house on Clapham Common dating back to about 1712. When they were having it redecorated recently they found money and bills of the period behind some panelling.—*Woman's Page, "Evening Standard," London.*

NOT TO MENTION 10,000,000 DEAD

The last war cost the world £80,000,000,000. That sum, figures a statistician, could have provided every family in Britain, Canada, Australia, the U.S.A., Germany, France, Belgium and Russia with a £500 house, and £200 worth of furniture, standing on five acres of land. A £1,000,000 library and a £2,000,000 university for every city with more than 100,000 inhabitants in those countries could also have been bought.—*"Evening Standard," London.*

REDS IN SUDETENLAND

by A. FADEYEV

From "Pravda," Moscow

EVERY summer the anti-fascist cultural organisations hold a Culture Day in the town of Liberec in the Sudeten province which borders on Germany. This is a day on which Czech and German anti-fascists get together.

I travelled out on a train packed with Czech and German workers, office employees, students, teachers, going there from Prague. They planned to pass the night in the open air and spend the next day holding meetings and making merry.

No sooner had the train steamed out of the Wilson station in Prague when red flags, kerchiefs and ribbons hung from every window waving merrily in the breeze.

A song is sung in both Czech and German.

"England had better mind her own business,
We'll settle the question without her help."

That is how the Czech and German working people in Czechoslovakia feel.

The engine drivers, the switchmen, the workers at crossings, peasants in the fields know what train ours is and whither it is bound and they greeted us with the "Red Front" salute. In reply hundreds of hands clenched in fists are thrust out of the windows and the air resounds with the greetings, "Nazdar" (the form of greetings used by the "Sokols," members of the national sports society) and "Red Front."

At one station three trains meet—a troop train, a train carrying "Sokols" and our train. Everyone jumps out of the cars and at once the platform and the space between the tracks are filled with a noisy, colourful, fraternising throng.

Thus, with songs and red flags, we enter the town of Liberec. On the platform are none but police. That is a good sign, for it means that the Henleinites have not been allowed on the platform. The police assume stern expressions but it is easy to see that their hearts are with us. They are Czech police.

The people fold up the red flags, form into a column and march through the station out into the streets of Liberec. We foreign newspapermen walk on the pavement as observers. Progress is difficult. The

pavements are crowded with cocky young men dressed in short knee breeches and white socks, their hairy knees bared. Singing the same songs as before, the column marches briskly through the streets of Liberec with upraised fists and shouts of "Red Front" and "Nazdar" toward Koenigsbursch, a small suburb where the celebrations are to be held. From the pavement in the wake of the marchers come hostile, angry shouts of "Heil Hitler!" "Heil Henlein!" But one can observe the sympathetic faces of passers-by in civilian dress, who do not venture to raise their voices. Here and there, however, from the depths of the hostile crowd clenched fists are thrust and the "Red Front" greetings heard. Instantly a scuffle takes place, which is promptly stopped by the police.

The Henlein storm detachments are considered disbanded and the wearing of uniforms has been forbidden by law. But both detachments and uniforms exist quite openly. Some of the more insolent of Henlein's followers risk wearing the uniform even on the streets of Prague. But I myself witnessed how the Prague street undresses these "braves." It is done most politely. I might even say, democratically—in the Czech manner. The "brave" is lifted up so that his clothes should not be soiled (the Lord forbid!) by falling on the asphalt pavement, his boots are unlaced, his white socks removed, his boots are laced up again and the socks are thrust into his pocket.

But here we are in Koenigsbursch where there are a great many anti-fascists. En route we pass a meeting of Henleinites being held in a garden. Entire battalions of police are stationed between the two zones in order to prevent them from clashing. It has already grown dark and the large Koenigsbursch square is thronged. A hastily erected stage is flooded with lights, there is a lively trade in beer, sausages and sandwiches in the little illuminated stands placed around the square. A meeting is in progress. Bursts of applause, shouts of "Zdar" and "Red Front" are heard. Suddenly an ovation thunders out lasting for ten minutes: "Long Live the Soviet Union!" "Long Live the Red Army!" "Health to Stalin!"

I notice a group of Czech soldiers in the crowd and approach them:

"What is the situation on the border?"

"Nothing new. We are standing by for the time being."

"Are they provoking you?"

"Something happens every day."

"And what do you do?"

"Once we gave it to them, but now we are not allowed to, so we are biding our time. A week ago the Henleinites held a demonstration right on the border and the peasants from the other side shouted: "You can have our Adolf; give us three hunks of bread!"

The popular rejoicing lasted all night, only to break out with renewed force at sunrise. On the day of the celebration more than 20,000 anti-fascists assembled in Koenigsbursch. The German anti-fascists are indeed heroes. If you remember the extent to which the workers of the Sudeten province are at the mercy of their Henlein masters, if you think of the unemployment, the espionage, when every step by a worker is known to his boss, when school-teachers question their pupils about the political views of their parents, when every honest man who dares to raise his voice against Henlein risks poverty and starvation, these people who fight the fascists are people of iron will. But they know that they are expressing the thoughts and desires of the overwhelming majority of the population of the Sudeten province which, under the Henlein regime, cannot speak out in its defence.

Of late, under pressure from Britain, the Czechoslovak government is making concessions to Henlein. This, of course, is its own business. But the people who guide the policy of the Czechoslovak republic must know that they are now being put to the test by their people. And this is at the same time a test of history. A people cannot perish; it will live forever and it will never forget and never forgive.

EIGHT POINTS

The Sudetens have announced their eight points at Karlovy-Vary.

In our turn, conscious, alas, of also only representing a minority, we have met in our concrete cellar in the Rue d'Antin, and we have also reduced our demands to eight points.

Here they are :

1. No war.
2. No war.
3. No war.
4. No war.
5. No war.
6. No war.
7. No war.
8. No war.

We must add that these eight points are indivisible and that we cannot permit the deletion of a single one.

We would rather go to war.—*"Le Canard Enchainé," Paris.*

MEDIATORS TWO-A-PENNY

"Marianne," Paris

"Can I tempt you, gentlemen? We have a nice line in mediators going cheap."

"L'Oeuvre," Paris

"I am frightened of an unprovoked incident. I won't go home without Lord Runciman."

"Marianne" Paris

THOSE FILM STARS!

". . . and now there's that Simone Simon making a speech on the Czech problem!"

ALAS FOR BUNS

Among words winged to-day are those of a newspaper telling us that women who wear their hair in the shape of "buns" will not be able to wear gas-masks. This is the sort of thing that helps us to keep our sense of humour if not of proportion.—*"The Star," London.*

ENGLISH TRADITIONAL STRATEGY
Necessity for an Expeditionary Force

by GENERAL ARMENGAND (of the Air Force)

From the "Dépêche de Toulouse," 2.8.38

THE English are unduly attached to their traditional strategy, which demands that their navy, and that new kind of navy—the air force—should be stronger than those of any other power, the army being of very secondary importance. Accordingly, they have made huge efforts on sea, and more especially in the air, where they have let themselves be surpassed by Germany. To them it would seem imprudent to make an increased effort over the land army since that would lessen results on behalf of the other two forces. Consequently, they cling to the antique notion that they should avoid prematurely engaging the army outside the country, and they cast aside the doctrine of a massed intervention on the continent even though it might mean an immediate advantage to their allies.

The English doctrine pleases men in the Navy who think the security of certain countries like France and England is primarily determined on the sea, and members of the Air Force who give first importance to the army in the air.

I myself think that the English Navy, Air Force and Army should be equal and that operations for the defence, the conquest or the mastery of a determined zone should be entrusted more and more to a combination of the three forces whenever possible. In not realising this fact, England is out of touch with the times. For example, the development of the strength of the lighter naval forces and the air forces would rule out the Mediterranean if Italy should be in conflict with England and France; maritime communications from the west to the east could only be maintained by way of territorial waters *after the conquest of Libya, with the assistance of the three armies of the land, the sea and the air.*

As another example—a land army would play an important rôle in the defence of the English sky and coasts. If the Reich armies should take possession of the coasts of Flanders and the Pas de Calais, the situation of England would be tragic. If, on the contrary, these armies were held back on the eastern frontiers of Belgium, air invasions would be difficult and unremunerative. Moreover, the range of the English air

force in offensive action would be much greater than in the first hypothesis. The same is true of English domination of the North Sea. So it is a categorical imperative for the general strategy of the United Kingdom to stop a German invasion as near as possible to the eastern frontier of the Low Countries with the Army and the Air Force.

True to tradition, the English do not close their eyes to obvious realities. The events of Central Europe are forcing a fairly rapid evolution of ideas on the rôle of the army. Voices are lifted declaring the necessity of a larger expeditionary force than on the eve of war in 1914.

How Could Czechoslovakia Be Helped?

These obvious realities are the rapid growth of the effectives and armaments of the German army and the fortifications facing France which, because of their length, make direct help for Czechoslovakia more and more difficult.

Six days after mobilisation the Germans would have forty divisions at their disposal, sixty divisions nine days afterwards, and in a fortnight a total of 160 divisions. After a brief delay the Italians could bring up forty divisions and a total of sixty-five divisions towards the fifteenth day.

It is equality in the forces which would be called on to face each other immediately which maintains peace. Let us reason as the great German general staff may do. It knows that decisive military successes may be obtained during the first few weeks of a war by an offensive carried out on a very large front, for example against Czechoslovakia from Upper Silesia to Hungary, or against France from Holland to the Alps. It knows that the conquest of the terrain becomes extremely slow, costly and difficult a few weeks after the opening of hostilities.

It cannot be satisfied with a plan for an initial victorious invasion of Czechoslovakia only, and a change of offensive three or four weeks later to invade and conquer France. The first offensive would no doubt be victorious but the second would fail. *It is a double offensive against the east and the west which would bring complete, rapid and decisive victory.*

For this a considerable superiority would be required of the armies of Italy and Germany over those of France and Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Holland, allowing for a waiting attitude on the part of Poland and Yugoslavia.

Imagining the hypothesis of aggression against Czechoslovakia, they would consider a French offensive to be a deplorable military plan because it would probably be doomed to failure at the feeble point where it could be developed.

Certainly their argument is very strong. Nevertheless, the allies in the last war adopted this plan and pursued it uninterruptedly. Also, it does not exclude another, that of which Mr. Winston Churchill was the tireless apostle from the beginning of 1915, and which consisted of the armies of the east intervening towards the middle of Europe through Serbia and Salonika.

Today, to put a stop to the German avalanche a similar plan of operations should be followed at once. But if Italy were hostile a passage through the Mediterranean would have to be opened up which would involve, as was said above, the rapid conquest of Libya by the Anglo-French armies in Africa.

Italian Threat to Egypt

But would it not rather be Egypt which would be conquered by the Italian army? The English army in Egypt and the Near East consists of only about 20,000 men. A few months ago, Italy had 40,000 men in Libya, on the frontiers of Egypt, and more than 150,000 men in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

No doubt the growing British power on sea and in the air are important supports. But the English navy, when it was the most powerful in Europe, did not prevent war from shaking the continent from one end to the other for eleven years at the beginning of the last century. And to-day it is a question of preventing war in Europe.

The possible German offensive through the Low Countries would be discouraged by fortifications as solid as our Maginot Line, erected in front of Brussels and Antwerp as far as the plateau of Waterloo, and by enough active forces to occupy them with sufficient strength. England can do a lot in this direction by her influence over Belgium and Holland, and herself, by her capital and her army.

The possible offensive of Germany against Czechoslovakia with the virtual or effective support of Italy would be made less likely by strong action in the military sphere by England complementing that of France. This would result from the existence of a British Expeditionary Force stronger than that of 1914 and ready to cross the Channel, together with important armies in the Near East and in Egypt.

PAWNS IN THE GAME

SOUTH TIROL SACRIFICED

by GUNNAR ALMSTEDT

From the "Weltwoche," Zürich

In 1919 the German-speaking province of South Tirol, together with the Italian Trentino, was taken from Austria and annexed to the Italian Kingdom under the terms of the secret Treaty of London, of April 1915, which contained the offers which brought Italy into the last war on the Franco-British side against her own ally. No plebiscite was held in South Tirol and the protests of the population were ignored. The results of a plebiscite would have been a foregone conclusion. The last Austrian census of 1910 showed a total population of 245,000, of which 223,000 were German-speaking Tirolese; 16,000 were Ladins (akin to the Romansch-speaking people of the Engadine) and only 6,000 Italians. It is a curious phenomenon that whereas Herr Hitler has apparently had to abandon the South Tirolese in order to secure Signor Mussolini's support, the Socialists and Communists of the world are now pressing the claims of these persecuted Germans

SOUTH TIROL, the home of an ancient culture, is proved to have had a purely German population for nearly fourteen hundred years. By the treaty of St. Germain it was, for strategical reasons, given to Italy, much against the wishes of Lloyd George and Wilson. The Peace Treaty does not include any clause concerning the rights of the South Tirolese minority; guarantees were considered unnecessary because the Italian delegates had declared that "united and free Italy" would naturally respect the cultural institutions of other peoples.

But soon after the Treaties were signed a very marked policy of denationalisation was inaugurated, which has not been appreciably modified since Hitler has been in power.

At the time of the Austrian Anschluss the South Tirolese hoped that the hour of release had come for them too. The news of Hitler's entry into Vienna spread like wildfire, and soon people began to think that it was only a matter of hours or days before North and South Tirol would be united once more. When nothing happened, the rumour spread

that when Hitler visited Rome, Mussolini would make him a present of South Tirol. The situation in North Tirol was similar. There was even a rumour, after Hitler's entry, that the union of South Tirol with the Reich had already taken place. One of the newly-appointed National Socialist officials at the Government offices in Innsbruck, when questioned on the subject, replied: "Yes, we have had two telegrams from Vienna, saying that Mussolini has given us back South Tirol." A few hours later the rumour was officially denied by the Linz wireless station. In Innsbruck the denial was made in a less official way; Storm Troopers went through the various restaurants, declaring that the rumour was the result of "communist provocation." An incident at one restaurant was typical of the mood of the day. When the Storm Troopers had read their proclamation, there was a disappointed silence until two Italians who happened to be present began to applaud, whereupon one of the Storm Tropers who had just read the proclamation went to them and said: "But we shall get it all the same."

For the time being, however, such developments were out of the question. On the contrary, the Germans closed the two Institutions which had until then maintained connections between North and South Tirol—the Andreas Hofer League and the *Arbeitsstelle für Suedtirol.*

Desperation

In spite of this, the South Tirolese did not give up hope. Just because they looked on Hitler as the only man who could save them, they could not and would not believe that the "Leader of all Germans" would abandon to its fate that German land on the southern slopes of the Alps whose ancient teutonic culture was in such desperate straits.

After many protests from workmen about discrimination in the distribution of work in favour of newly-arrived Italians, the Mayor of Schlanders—like all Mayors and Town Clerks in South Tirol, an Italian—sent a punitive expedition into the refractory district. This did not prevent all German cars that passed through South Tirolese villages being greeted with "Heil Hitler!" while children were frequently photographed standing in front of these cars and holding Swastika flags.

In the village of Laas the punitive expedition fired at the unarmed population and a 27 year old workman called Ludwig Stricker was fatally wounded. The body was brought on the 25th April from the Meran Hospital to his native village for burial. The Italians tried to

prevent the villagers from attending the funeral by bringing the coffin to the village at 2.30 a.m. and demanding that the service should take place at once. The priest refused to hold the service before seven, when the funeral took place and was attended, although the grave was surrounded by sixty armed Militiamen, by more than 1,000 people of the neighbourhood. A man who gave the Hitler greeting at the graveside was arrested. Simultaneously there was a wave of arrests in the Vintschgau district, which included amongst others that of the former deputy in the Italian Parliament, Karl Tinzl, who was imprisoned at Schlanders.

No news of these events, which took place a week before Hitler's visit to Rome, was allowed to appear in the German Press.

Far less attention is paid in Germany to the South Tirolese than to the Sudeten Germans. No protest is raised over the facts that Italian is the compulsory language in schools and law-courts, and that even theatrical performances in German are forbidden. Anyone who teaches German children their mother-tongue, even privately, risks his money and his freedom. Italian workmen are introduced into the land by artificial methods, and favoured at the expense of the original population. More dangerous still for the people, who are almost all owners of small-holdings, is the organisation known as the *"Ente de Rinascita per le tre Venezie,"* which has the right to expropriate every land holding.

It is in the circumstances not surprising that the Germans in South Tirol are losing their faith in Hitler as a Deliverer. A typical manifestation of the despair of the South Tirolese in the "South Tirolese Horst Wessel Song," written after Hitler's visit to Rome and circulated widely in South Tirol:

"In deepest sleep, the windows thickly curtained,
You pass through the German land of South Tirol,
You, the only hope of your German fellow countrymen,
The last dream of deliverance—Good-bye!

Our arms, already raised in greeting, sank,
But not our courage, which always fills our souls,
As we heard that, up there at the Brenner,
That frontier, drawn at St. Germain, must remain.

We will not now or ever admit defeat,
We feel more German now than ever before.
A day will come, after these Roman-German days,
When the red eagle will once more arise!"

HUNGARY NEXT
Sailing in Germany's Wake

by PAUL KERI (Budapest)

From "Die Neue Weltbühne," Paris, 1.9.38

The British were foolishly optimistic over the conclusion of a provisional agreement at Bled in Jugoslavia last month between Hungary and the States of the Little Entente, according to this observer. Cession of the Sudetenland to Germany in accordance with the Franco-British plan certainly means a similar claim against Czechoslovakia from Hungary, with Rumania next on the list.

IN Germany the Bled agreement (between Hungary and the countries of the Little Entente) was very coolly received; in England, on the other hand, a downright silly interpretation was put on Horthy's trip to Kiel. The English press greeted the Bled agreement with a display of excessive optimism, which astonished people in Budapest more than anywhere. Really nothing had been done to cause this outburst of joy, which originated in the obstinate English notion that no one can be so deeply entrenched on one side of a barricade that he cannot maintain relations with the other.

At the Bled conference they agreed on issuing an "identical" communiqué, which nevertheless turned out to be not quite identical. The States of the Little Entente referred to themselves as "the States of the Little Entente," while in the Hungarian communiqué they were spoken of as "Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia."

For the last year and a half Hungary has ignored the existence of a Little Entente. Up to then the heavily armed Little Entente was in the mouths of politicians and the columns of all the newspapers as the hated obstacle to peaceful treaty revision. Gradually this has changed. For a year now, in fact since the world press started talking of an encouraging *rapprochement* between Hungary and the Little Entente, this term "Little Entente" has ceased to exist in Hungary. It may no longer be mentioned in Magyar and in diplomatic discussions; scrupulous care is taken to see that negotiations are conducted bilaterally, with Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia individually.

Hungary never wanted even to make identical agreements with each of these states; she insisted on making different agreements concerning minorities with Rumania and Jugoslavia from that with Czechoslovakia.

HUNGARY'S LOST CITIZENS *"Hungarian Quarterly"*

This discrimination against Czechoslovakia has been obstructed, and to that extent Bled meant a success for the Czechs. But Hungary has still not abandoned her intention of concluding a different agreement about minorities with Czechoslovakia. She has merely postponed action until the European situation changes, or as the semi-official *Pester Lloyd* says: "until, with time, it becomes possible to make Czechoslovakia take a better view of the question of Hungarian minorities."

The dream of frontier revision—let there be no mistake about it—has penetrated deeply among all ranks and classes. That is an example of how one-sided propaganda can lead a country to suicidal thoughts and actions; for the Left, the Liberals, the Jews, and even the men around Count Bethlen, are committing moral and political suicide when they subordinate everything to revision and base Hungary's relations to other countries solely on the chances of procuring it. That is what has come to pass, and Hungarian society is now much more intransigent on the subject than is official policy itself. Of late Hungarian politicians have made their demands more precise. The claims for frontier revision against Jugoslavia have been allowed to drop since the death of King Alexander. And Count Bethlen, himself a Siebenbürger, (now in Rumanian territory) a year and a half ago, when he had more authority

to speak, renounced revisionist demands against Rumania. Since then, claims for revision have been concentrated against Czechoslovakia.

Even before that, propaganda had been loudest against Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that the Hungarian cultural and national minority there was much better off than in the two other countries. Nevertheless, so long as it was a matter of the recovery of *all* the lost parts of Hungary, such nuances were of no importance. But to-day it is the negation of common sense to renounce claims against Rumania and Jugoslavia, where the Magyars are treated so much more badly, and only to demand the return of the Slovaks and Magyars from Czechoslovakia.

Geza Szüllö, the leader of the irredentist Magyars in Czechoslovakia, recently gave an explanation of this paradox. "Rumania and Jugoslavia," he said, "are more or less dictatorial monarchies, but Czechoslovakia is a democratic republic." Geza Szüllö understands what is really behind revision: sullen hatred of democracy and the anxiety of the Hungarian feudal lords to assure their own reactionary rule—*at all costs.* It is amazing what good intentions the world's press has been attributing to the Hungarian rulers who visited Germany. It was stated that they wanted to rescue their country from the German *Drang nach dem Osten.* Bled and the trip to Germany were said to be a despairing last attempt to shield Hungary from German greed. These sentimentalists were satisfied by the remark in Hitler's speech: "Now that we, as neighbours, have found our final boundaries." Of course the English can once more point out that Hitler has given a guarantee somewhere or other. City gentlemen can now do business with Hungary without qualms, so that she will acquire the foreign exchange which she needs because she has to pay for her political deal with Germany—and which she needs a lot of, to enable her to do without her trade with Czechoslovakia.

Nazis and Holy Revision

Horthy and Imrédy represent two groups. The people surrounding the Regent have always protected the Fascists from the presumptions of the "constitutional" aristocracy—i.e. from Bethlen and his lot. Now things have gone so far that it would be regarded as treason towards the holy cause of revision and Hungary's military interests if Horthy were to take energetic action against the Hungarian Nazis. He may not be longing for a hundred per cent co-ordination with Germany; certainly he will do nothing to prevent it. Szalasi, the Hungarian Nazi leader, it is

true, wanted more; he wanted to put himself in Horthy's place and was too stupid even to conceal the fact. He attacked the highest quarters and reproached the Regent's wife with having a grandmother, who, although rich and distinguished, had been born a Jewess. Now the Regent wanted to make his position safe in case another Bürckel, (the German Nazi Governor of Austria) should be placed over him in Hungary. At present, since he is still being courted, he may succeed. The honour which Madame Horthy was shown in Kiel by being made sponsor to the *Prinz Eugen* (the new German battleship), shows that Horthy's personal position has been assured.

Premier Imrédy's Rôle

Imrédy is no Nazi. He could have betrayed the bourgeois clerical tradition of his family and made a career for himself as a renegade; but he chose a cleverer method. He likes to be known as the Hungarian Schacht. As an expert on national planning he is to put through the Five Year Plan, the great preparation for war within the framework of German military preparedness.

Because Imrédy is no Nazi he has maintained a cool neutrality

WOOING THE WOLF

"Moscow News"

towards Nazi efforts. The government itself has not much to say in such matters. Szalasi, who was originally only condemned to a few weeks imprisonment, got three years' penal servitude from a higher tribunal nearer to Horthy. Szalasi is only a comic figure; he is an Armenian, and from an Armenian to a Jew is but a step. Above all he has attacked the Regent personally, and had him portrayed with a lock of hair coming down his forehead. The Seyss-Inquarts, Henleins, Szalasis are only passing figures; it is only at the moment of action that the decision is made, who is to be Nazi Governor.

Jewish Policy The Clue

More important than the Szalasi affair is the fact that the government has just announced the issue of new industrial employment laws. Ten thousand Jewish employees driven out of their businesses are to be prevented from earning their living in crafts or retail trade. The Hungarian Jews are condemned, finished.

How a government handled the Jewish question used not always to be the decisive factor by which to judge its entire policy. But to-day? If Mussolini is now taking up anti-Semitism it is not because there is a racial problem in his Empire, nor because he can thus do Hitler a favour which costs nothing. He is doing it because he knows what a powerful lever anti-Semitism can be in politics, both internal and external. Wherever anti-Semitism ousts all other questions, National Socialism, which preaches it wholeheartedly, must sooner or later hold the field. And that is the case in Hungary.

Imrédy does not conceal the fact that he is not an anti-Semite by nature. He was not always called Imrédy; the "y" was added. He comes from an old family of Odenburg Germans. The racial question is not his cup of tea; it does not concern him; he just wants to be a Schacht, nothing else. Beuve-Méry, the clever correspondent of the *Temps* has called the Imrédy regime the Hungarian Schuschnigg era. But he is wrong there. In the first place, Schuschnigg worked so successfully for Austria's economic independence that the Nazis found a lot of treasure to remove from Vienna; in the second place, Austria was a German state, Schuschnigg a German politician—he could only have saved himself if he had jumped over to the other side of the barricade. Imrédy, on the other hand, has enthusiastically undertaken the task of attaching Hungary economically to Germany. It should be the normal task of Hungarian statesmen to

preserve the independence of the Magyar nation. But that is not what they are doing; they would rather take a chance on frontier revision.

It is correct that Hungary won a certain breathing spell at Bled. But not in order to make a stand against Germany's lust for conquest. She only wants to wait and see if Hitler will really succeed in doing what he intends. If any of Hungary's freedom is saved it will not be because of the resistance of Hungarian rulers. They have already surrendered. If Hungary is saved she will have only the heroic resistance of Czechoslovakia to thank. The politicians of Hungary will in that event be surprised at Hitler's loss of power and prestige, and, with the support of the Western powers, they might even succeed in escaping complete subjection. But by any determination on their own part? Never.

LEFT OVER FROM THE LAST WAR

"Take care, it hasn't exploded yet!"

"Il Travaso delle Idee," Rome

BRITAIN THE NEW CARTHAGE
Is Mediterranean Peace Possible?

From the Rome Correspondent of the "Weltwoche," Zürich

PEACE goes on obstinately refusing to come to the Mediterranean. Or, rather, the co-existence of two Mediterranean hegemonies side by side is not proving so easy to establish as was thought, in spite of all Gentlemen's Agreements. Some months ago efforts were obviously being made on the Italian side, as on the English, to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force, in spite of the Spanish affair's still not being "settled." And, for a time, it looked as if this masterpiece, this squaring of the circle, was in fact about to be achieved. But then suddenly everything went to bits again. Attempts at sabotage were made from French and Russian quarters. In France and England the Left worked strongly against it. The proposal made by General Franco, and supported by Italy, to create a safety zone in Almeria harbour for British ships, was torpedoed forthwith. That caused unbounded annoyance in Italy. The Duce made his celebrated speech in front of a threshing machine against the "Demoplutocracies." Italy's attitude again stiffened visibly.

And now the same has happened in the other Mediterranean Power, England. In his last speech before Parliament rose, Chamberlain, to everyone's astonishment, declared that the withdrawal of the Italian volunteers would not suffice to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement into force. The position in Spain after the withdrawal of the volunteers, he said, must be clarified before the Agreement could become effective. This fresh stiffening of the British attitude towards Italy is rightly interpreted by foreign observers in London as meaning that "the British Government is, after all, more anxious to maintain the Mediterranean as a free channel than it has been thought to be."

It may well be said of this stiffening of both sides that it once more throws a vivid light on the great difficulties which stand in the way of a realisation of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, and rouses fresh doubts whether real understanding and peaceful co-operation between the two Powers is in fact possible.

This reappearance of Anglo-Italian differences, and the bitter struggle which is again going on in Spain brings up the question once more, whether the Spanish expedition really does signify merely an

"adventure" for Fascist Italy, as is maintained in many quarters, or whether it is part of a great foreign-political conception, an important part of the future of the new Roman Empire as envisaged by Mussolini, and therefore hardly to be abandoned by him overnight.

This question, as well as the other, why Anglo-Italian understanding still meets with such difficulties, can perhaps be cleared up to a certain extent by a glance at events in the more ancient history of Rome, which, in spite of their having happened two thousand years ago, look astonishly real and modern to-day.

Even at the time of the old Roman Empire, statesmen invariably advocated the view that Rome herself, her mastery of the Mediterranean and, indeed, her entire position in the world, could only be secured were she to possess control over the harbours of the Iberian Peninsula, in addition to the littorals of the present Balkan countries, Asia Minor and North Africa. Scipio Africanus was the greatest exponent of this Roman policy. After him it became traditional; and the historians of to-day, when observing present Mediterranean problems, refer to him again and again.

What was the set-up in those days, when Rome for the first time began consciously to press forward into the position of a world power? The great problem of the day was the rivalry between Rome and Carthage. The two did not, however, only wrangle, but made honest efforts to come to an agreement and live peacefully side by side. From 264 B.C. to 146 B.C., everything possible was attempted in order to create good neighbourly relations; but the attempts failed every time, and finally resolved themselves into the 120-year-long conflict of the three Punic Wars. Between the first and the second wars, however, there was an interlude of 23 years' peace, and between the second and third one of 52 years. During these interludes "Gentlemen's Agreements," carefully worked out by the diplomatists of the day, were concluded again and again. Yet the force of facts was too strong for all these agreements. And when Rome finally could no longer tolerate the rival claim to mastery, and took the path prescribed by Nature—that of a political naval policy—the conflict came to a head, and the great political problem of the day was only finally solved by the destruction of Carthage—and in the same year, of Corinth.

The co-existence of the Roman and Carthaginian hegemonies in the Mediterranean had, in fact, proved itself impossible, and Roman world

supremacy only became reality after the competition of Carthage was finally removed.

In all these developments the great Scipio Africanus (with whose political ideas Mussolini has much in common) played an important, pioneering rôle. In order to consolidate Rome's power, Scipio had first to gain a firm foothold in Spain (211-206 B.C.) and, subsequently in North Africa, for only on so extensive a foundation, he said, could the Roman Imperium exist. Carthage called in the help of Macedonia and Syria; but the aid of these countries was unavailing. Rome triumphed, under Scipio's masterly leadership, over Carthage; a few years later, in 190 B.C., he fought in Syria and so completed his imperial work.

As can be seen, there is really a certain resemblance between Rome's Mediterranean policy at the time of Scipio and that of Mussolini's Italy to-day. Rome and Carthage two thousand years ago endeavoured to come to a peaceful agreement over the mastery of the Mediterranean, and Italy and England are trying to solve the same problem to-day. And, just as Rome and Carthage were unable to achieve this goal, Italy and England are failing to-day. Just as Scipio believed he must gain a firm foothold in Spain and Africa in order to found and secure the Imperium, the Duce to-day has his eyes fixed on these two coastal strips. Just as

"Le Canard Enchainé"

"First comes a bombardment, then come diplomatic notes, and one fine day one wakes up with a treaty of friendship round one's neck!"



Paris

AT GENEVA

"What is needed, you see, is to unite the nations in a kind of League. . . ."

Carthage was once the stronger sea power compared with Rome, so is England to-day compared with Italy. And just as Carthage called on the help of Macedonia, Syria and other Mediterranean lands in her defence against Rome's growing power, so England at the time of the Abyssinian war and sanctions won over the coastal countries of the Mediterranean to an anti-Italian alliance.

Naturally, no too far-reaching conclusions should be drawn from this analogy. But it is certainly interesting and apposite. It shows how extraordinarily difficult efforts to divide the Mediterranean zones of mastery into two 50-50 parts have proved in the course of history to be.

Deeper Than Spain

It is being assumed at present that it is only the still unsettled Spanish question which is preventing the Anglo-Italian Agreement from coming into force. But anyone who knows Roman history will suspect that the real grounds for the inability of England and Italy to come together lie much deeper. By concluding the new Gentleman's Agreement, England theoretically acknowledged Italian parity in the Mediterranean. Now, however, when it is a matter of carrying it out in practice, England does not seem altogether agreeable to giving up her 230-year-old hegemony in favour of a division of power with Italy. And the great question, round which the whole of Anglo-Italian relations have been revolving for years now, i.e. whether a peaceful division of spheres of influence in the Mediterranean is historically possible at all, can still by no means be regarded as having been answered in the affirmative.

THE BETTER WAY

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, was, we know, greeted by his colleague Goering with particular friendliness on his visit to Germany. Goering, clad all in white, welcomed him at Karinhall, and in the course of conversation enquired about the French General's children. "She has two teeth already," he said proudly of his own daughter.

A deep impression was made in Germany by General Vuillemin's gesture in presenting the German ocean flyers, Heinke and Moreau with French air badges. In order not to be outdone in courtesy, General Milch pinned German air badges on the breasts of the French pilots.

An officer watching this exchange of courtesies remarked : "Anyway, it's a good deal better to exchange decorations than to have to win them by fighting each other."—"*Weltwoche,*" *Zürich.*

JOHN BULL AND THE JEWS

THE GRIP TIGHTENS

by MARIO PETTINATI

From the "Gazetta del Popolo," Turin, 3.9.38

IF you speak of racialism to the English, ninety out of a hundred frown disapprovingly and inveigh against persecution.

And yet, a few nights ago, the mere fact that three coloured artistes newly arrived from America went to a small hotel in the capital (by no means one of the most aristocratic) was enough to make all the English residents rise *en masse* and protest: "Either the negresses clear out, or we do." So that the manager, with great tact, but equal energy, was obliged to show his chocolate-coloured guests the door and put them up—after vainly offering them to a dozen other hotels—in a common guest-house where neither the passports nor the colour of the clients' faces is too closely scrutinised.

This little episode shows that the same John Bull who protests against the racial campaign of others and decries us because we try to isolate our race and keep it pure, is the first to apply in practice what he denies in theory.

Here too, therefore, whether the English admit it or not, racialism exists, in fact, a racialism so deep and well-defined that even to-day—when distances have been well nigh annihilated—a few miles of ocean are enough to form an abyss between the "*civis britannicus*" and the rest of the world.

"Barbarians begin at Calais"—wrote an Englishman a century ago, and the statement is as true to-day as it was then. One may have lived half a century in England, one may have shared business interests, friendships, amusements with the English, one may have become a member of their Clubs, a partner in their enterprises, the companion of their most intimate life, but in their eyes the foreigner never ceases to be the "alien," the "barbarian": the division is clear, the gulf is immense, and no bridge of interests, friendships, or mutual esteem can span it.

Anyone arriving at Dover for the first time is immediately conscious of it; arriving for the hundredth time one realises it even more.

But in the past Jews have made important breaches in this racialism which is engraved in the heart of every Englishman. Guided by their

flair for business and their unscrupulous adaptability, they found in England the most favourable terrain: the materialistic opportunism, the greed for gold and power, the imperialistic ambition and the craving for conquest which have guided England from the dawn of the nineteenth century up to the present, have constituted the easiest and the most convenient platform for Jewish expansion and predomination.

Timid at first, submissive, whining and relegated to the poorest quarters of London and the more important cities, the Jews have gradually became bolder, more self-assured, more exacting. From the East of London, where they had been banished by the English of the early Victorian era, they slowly moved towards the centre, towards Belgravia, Mayfair, Hampstead, Kensington, towards the districts inhabited by the aristocracy and the well-to-do, passing *via* of course, the City, and penetrating even into Whitehall and Buckingham Palace.

Invasion of the West End

Little by little the East End, the cradle of the Jews in London, has become empty: the ghetto has broken its barriers: to-day, only foreigners go to Whitechapel seeking a legendary Jew who changed his abode some time ago and has left only a vague, picture postcard souvenir of himself. To-day, British Israel no longer lives beyond the Tower of London, where the metropolis begins to mingle with the sombre reaches of the Port, amidst the darkness of the City: he has changed his name and his quarters; he is no longer called Clozenberg, Rausen, Nussbaum, Neuman and Friedman, but Clevering, Rowson, Nuttboan, Newman and Frees: he does not live in a hovel now, but owns a fine house in the smart suburbs of Hampstead and Golders Green or a fine flat in the West End: he does not wear rags and go on foot, but he wears "tails" and a top hat, and goes about in a Daimler and a Rolls Royce. He no longer knocks at the door seeking employment, nor does he spend long hours behind a shop-counter. Now that he is rich, an employer, he in his turn distributes wealth and employment, controlling the markets, fixing prices and salaries, bargaining at will with the products of human labour, favouring whom he will and destroying anyone who dares oppose or threaten him.

The coming of the Jews to England is not of recent date. A century has elapsed since Lord Macaulay's famous speech in favour of the concession of civil and political liberty to the Jews, in favour of their admittance to Parliament, to the Law Courts and the administrative life

of the nation. Disraeli, Sassoon, Solly Joel (Egypt, India and South Africa) are by now historical figures. But the complete domination of Israel over John Bull, the passing into Jewish hands of the economic and political power of the greatest empire in the world, which makes Arnold Leese—the precursor and the apostle of British anti-semitism—say that England by now has become a "Jewish country" is of comparatively recent date, and for that reason less known.

How many Jews are there in England? In 1914—according to the most trustworthy information—they did not number 300,000: to-day—again according to the most reliable sources of information—they have reached 1,500,000. An exact census does not exist and never will exist, because the Jew, just as he feels no scruples about changing his name, is quite prepared to conceal his own religion. In English prisons, for instance, the prisoners who admit that they are Jewish are extremely rare, so that in the official statistics one finds the strange phenomenon of an enormous number of convicted persons "without religion" compared with a negligible number of Jews and a large number of Protestants and Catholics.

In London alone, according to what one hears, there are 500,000 Jews amongst 7,000,000 inhabitants, that is to say about 8 per cent. In Manchester the proportion is 6 per cent, in Leeds 5 per cent.

To be even more precise there are certain districts in London where Jews—who were unknown there thirty years ago—to-day constitute the majority and German is the language spoken. In one street in the well-to-do district of Hampstead, out of ninety-two houses, two only are not inhabited by Jews: in Maida Vale there is a building with 64 flats, 47 of which are let to Jews.

SAXON-ISAACSONS

by S.B.A.

From the "Palestine Post," Jerusalem

WHEN we remember the profound influence that Palestine through the Scriptures has had on the religion and the speech and therefore the thought of the British people, it is not surprising to find ourselves carried back beyond historical records to the realm of mythology. In this way the connection between Palestine and Britain dates back further than most people would think.

According to the fervently held belief of some, part of the seafaring tribe of Dan left Palestine for Greece—where they embodied their name in the Dardanelles—whence they made an expedition to Ireland and settled there, even before the days of Jeroboam II. They then crossed to Scotland and were later—fifteen hundred years later—joined by a second part of the same tribe who had wandered in a northwesterly direction overland across Europe and settled in what they made known as Denmark, whence they invaded Britain. The tribe of Simeon became the Scythians, then became modified in name to Kimmerii, then Cymri, by which name the Welsh call themselves even to-day. They called the country which they finally occupied Britain; they themselves were British, that is Brit-ish, which is Hebrew for "People of the Covenant." Now the Saxons are plainly Isaacsons—that is obvious, and the Normans are but a branch of the same group of Northmen. The present inhabitants of the British Isles are therefore simply a re-union of the tribes of Israel, and their to-day's occupation of Palestine—their country of origin—is seen to be natural and pre-ordained.

Thus are first and last things united.

Not only, according to this belief, is the connection between Britain and Palestine a racial one. There is the strongest of personal links. For when Jeremiah went into exile after the destruction of the First Temple he did not go to Babylon, as is commonly supposed, but to his kinsmen in Ireland, taking with him a princess of the House of David. This lady married the ruler of Ireland, who was himself descended from Zarah, the son of Judah, and from them sprang the direct line whose representative in our own day is His Majesty King George VI. So much for mythology, as the British-Israelites read it.

AN ARAB VOICE
Myth of Jewish Power

From "As-Siraat al-Mustakim" (Arab Nationalist), Jerusalem

THERE has been a great deal in the press of late to the effect that British policy vis-à-vis Palestine is being dictated by World Jewry. What is the truth? How is it possible to believe that a great Imperial power with the resources of Great Britain, and which rules over large tracts of the earth's surface, would humble itself before a handful of

Jews; and would be the willing servant of a few million sons of Zion? We do not believe that Great Britain would allow her might and strength to be used in the interests of these people. He would have to be clever indeed who would persuade Britain to take any line of action except in her own interests.

Where is this much vaunted power of world Jewry? It was amply proved to the world by Hitler that it was built on foundations of deceit and questionable methods. Thus, we have a man like Dr. Weizmann uttering words to this effect to Great Britain:

"We shall remain in Palestine whether it is pleasing to you or not. You are able to accelerate or impede our progress at will. But you would be well advised to render us every assistance; otherwise our powers for construction could well be turned into powers of destruction, which would have disastrous results for the world. . . !"

The Jews, a self-confessed helpless and weak people, threaten the world with destruction! No one should have any fear of these people, particularly now that their weakness has been laid bare by a Hitler!

Britain's Imperialist Aims

It is a fact which admits of no argument or contradiction that it is manifestly in the interests of Great Britain to dominate Jewish policy. It is because of this that she favours a kind of Anglo-Zionist policy in Palestine. She is bent on breaking the power—however illusionary this might be—of the Jews as she has of other people who have stood in the way of her imperial ambitions.

Do not the Jews realise that the promise of the establishment of a National Home is rendering their existence in Europe untenable, quite apart from threatening them in Palestine itself? They can never recover their former position in Europe. They know well enough that they are in the hands of Great Britain and that this power is in a position to dictate to them as she has dictated to others.

Let the Jews do some heart-searching, and then they will be compelled to admit to themselves their great blunder. But they lack the courage to give voice to their thoughts, for by doing so they would lose the only sympathy left to them: that is, the sympathy of Great Britain.

Looking at the matter from another point, it would be well for all Arabs and Moslems to pay little heed to this mythical power of World Jewry. If the Arabs can convince Great Britain—and they are doing so—

that her interests lie in the seeking of Arab friendship, even though the scales are weighed heavily against the Jews, then her policy will take a new turn in the direction of service towards the Arab and Islamic worlds.

N. RHODESIA PROTESTS
Criticism of Settlement Plan

From the "Bulawayo Chronicle," 1.8.38

In our issue of July last we published a proposal by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi that the Jews might be granted a settlement area in Northern Rhodesia. Here are some criticisms from that Colony and its Southern partner

ATTENTION was called in these columns a day or two ago to a proposal made by Count R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi that Northern Rhodesia should be made available for Jewish settlement. That the idea has gone further than a proposal was disclosed by Sir Leopold Moore in a statement which he made when speaking at the opening of the Bindura Show. Sir Leopold said that the Imperial Government had designed a plan to settle in Northern Rhodesia five hundred families of Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany. "It won't strike you now as being very important," he said, "but if you think about it you will realise that 500 families in Northern Rhodesia would turn Northern Rhodesia into an annexe of Palestine."

We do not think Sir Leopold correctly forecasts the reaction of the people of this country to the proposal. They will immediately regard it as of outstanding—almost paramount—importance. There is not at the moment any need to go into the details of the matter, though these are of a primary importance. How could it be otherwise than important to know the class and character of these refugees? To raise one point only: in the main, the Jews who have hitherto come to the Rhodesias have not ranked among the producers, but have favoured occupations outside the producing ones. Could Northern Rhodesia reasonably be expected to absorb several hundred people to-day who are not producers? If they are producers what arrangements are to be made for the disposal of what they produce? Who is to finance the experiment? Can the Imperial Government legitimately finance such a scheme when it has before it

the report of a Commission which tells it bluntly that it has failed to make provision for the legitimate development of the people of the territory over whom it claims a trusteeship?

These and a score of other vitally important questions immediately arise, but it is futile now to discuss them. The outstanding point to stress at this moment is that the Imperial Government's proposal is ill-timed and inopportune to the point of being unjust to the people of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The future of these two countries is now being investigated by a Royal Commission appointed by the British Government, and it is surely unheard of that before that Commission's report is ready—before, indeed, the whole of the evidence has been collected—a decision should be taken by the Imperial Government which, if it is carried out, will fundamentally change the whole position.

WHY BRITISH TERRITORY?

From the "Rhodesia Herald," 29.7.38

THE admittance of Jewish refugees to a country in numbers not large enough adequately to cope with the general problem, yet large enough to upset the recognised balance of the established population, would inevitably provoke anti-Semitism. The question which the *World Review* article raises is whether there is not a land, still new and sparsely populated, where a readjustment could take place to provide a Jewish land. If it could be found it would be a solution. But whether Northern Rhodesia is such a land is another matter. Although the economic benefits to surrounding territories of large-scale development, on which capital would not be stinted, have to be remembered, various difficulties present themselves. One is whether this is the time to consider Northern Rhodesia when a Royal Commission is investigating amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Another is the question: Why should Great Britain, which did not make this Jewish problem, be expected to provide for its solution? This is an international matter, and if a sparsely-populated African territory is needed, Tanganyika, a mandated territory, would seem a better choice.

For Southern Rhodesia there is one outstanding lesson in the whole matter. A country which has only a handful of people for its population is the inevitable goal when pressure, economic or political, moves on a mass of the world's population.

FAIRIES IN EIRE
Strange Sights at Crossroads

A letter to "The Times," 6.9.38

Although we do not usually quote from English newspapers, we feel this is an occasion on which an exception is well justified, if only for the sake of our foreign readers

Sir,—I wonder if others of your readers who are depressed at times from reading so much about developments in Central Europe, the Far East, Spain, and other distracted parts of the world would be as interested as I was to hear that it is not wars, or rumours of wars, that are the topic of conversation in certain parts of Western Ireland. It was with a feeling of positive relief, after reading *The Times* from cover to cover, that I turned the other morning to the Dublin *Irish Press* and learned that "Watching for fairies has leaped into sudden popularity in West Limerick." Crowds, it was stated, were assembling in the evenings at cross-roads hoping to catch a glimpse of the "good little people"; boys and men had chased the fairies—"and they jumping the ditches as fast as a greyhound"—while a youth named Keely said he had actually held a leprechaun by the hand.

Old people there were, it is true, who shook their heads and said it was a "bad omen" to see so many of the "little people" at one time, and in broad daylight as well as in the evenings, and "many people—especially girls—are afraid to go out after dark," according to the story.

Here in part is what the *Irish Press* has to say about these strange occurences:—"John Keely, a schoolboy, seeing a fairy alone, on Tuesday, ran and told the Mulqueens about it. They sent him back to interrogate the little visitor, who admitted to Keely that he 'was from the mountains, and it's all equal to you what my business is.' "

Next day two fairies appeared at the cross-roads between Ballingarry and Kilfinney, six miles from Rathkeale, in daylight, with skipping-ropes, and "they could leap the height of a man," according to Robert and John Mulligan and other eye-witnesses. The little people allowed Keely to approach them and he actually took one of them by the hand and "set off along the road with him," he said. When the fairies spotted the others lying in wait in the nearby bushes they took fright and "away they went like the wind," with the Mulqueens, Keely, and others in hot pursuit.

Describing the unearthly visitors witnesses stated to the reporter that the leprechauns were about 2ft. in height and had "hard, hairy faces like men, and no ears." They were dressed in red, and one of them wore a white cape, and they wore knee-breeches and "vamps" instead of shoes. Several who claim to have chased the "little people" say that "though they passed through hedges, ditches, and marshes they appeared clean and neat all the time."

The locality where these strange doings are taking place is near the foot of Knockfierna, it is stated; this hill is steeped in fairy lore, and under it, according to tradition, is the palace of Donn, King of the Munster Fairies. People from Rathkeale, Croom, Adare, and other parts of Limerick are gathering at the cross-roads in the evenings, hoping to catch a glimpse of the Good People.

"We could not believe what we saw if anyone else told us," many told the reporter. "A suggestion that the 'fairies' may in fact be human 'midgets' brought from England by an Englishwoman is contradicted by her," it is stated.

I am, etc.,

JOHN BARRY.

25, Montagu Street, W.1.

A TRAGEDY OF JAPAN

Leaving a note reading, "I would rather die than continue to live and bother my neighbours with the bad smell of the rice-bran mash in my kitchen. I hereby tender my apologies to my neighbours by ending my life," Kuniko, wife of Isamu Ube, operative of the Army arsenal in Tokyo, committed suicide by swallowing poison.

It is stated that when she was churning the rice-bran mash in her kitchen several days ago, Uematsu, a neighbour was heard shouting, "What a smell!" again and again. He was actually addressing one of his sons, who was smashing rotten eggs against the wall in the backyard, but she thought the remarks were intended for her. She had been brooding ever since and finally killed herself.—*"Japan Chronicle," Kobe.*

JUNGLE DINNER JACKETS

A former Malayan living in retirement at Home writes: "The legend of the lonely Englishman dressing for dinner every night in the jungle surely arises from the fact that this is, or was, the custom of the employees of the Bombay-Burma Company when out on their tours through the Burma teak forests. I met two of these men years ago, and they both assured me that they donned dinner jackets every night and that that was a rigid custom in their company, never departed from."—*"Straits Budget," Singapore.*

IN SOUTH AMERICA

UNNOTICED PEACE

From "La Nacion," Buenos Aires, 5.8.38

TWO weeks after the signing in Buenos Aires of the peace treaty between Paraguay and Bolivia one still hopes to see in the European press a belated comment on an event of such political and legal importance. Unlike the slow passage of years in the Old Testament, time is now measured in weeks. Events with an international repercussion come tumbling over each other and to papers in Paris, London and Berlin two weeks can sometimes separate two eras in history.

Nevertheless, the Chaco peace treaty, which has crowned the work of the Buenos Aires conference, is one of those facts which the European press ought to make haste to place in the limelight, if only to bring a little comfort to the masses who are gradually and pathetically becoming resigned to the inevitability of war. This example of two countries, after two years of desperate fighting and heavy losses, now shaking each other warmly by the hand and entrusting the final settlement of their long-standing frontier dispute to their sister states, could never have reached Europe at a more opportune time, when one hears of nothing but armaments and when everybody is fearfully preparing for the worst.

Surely a failure now to recognise this peace treaty would suit the political game of the dictators who look upon war as the only solution of international disputes. For there is a chance that the dictators, sworn enemies of the League of Nations, might seize this opportunity to bring further discredit on the League at Geneva. They would point out that the League's prestige and wide influence was certainly not increased by the fact that the smaller "League of Nations" at Buenos Aires had met with such success while Geneva after much talk had accomplished nothing. And what more could the governments of London and Paris desire but that the European disputes, the cause of so much trouble, should be solved in the same way?

But the press in the democratic countries does not act on the instructions of ministers of propaganda. It is still a free press, with all the advantages and disadvantages of freedom. If the Chaco peace treaty passes unnoticed by them we shall not look upon this omission as a lack of interest in the New World, nor as a failure to realise its importance.

We realise that the explanation lies in the overwhelming sequence of events through which Europe is now passing. When there is one sick person in a household no one gives a thought to those who are well. When all eyes are turned on countries who are now fighting to the death, there is no time to look at those who are smoking the pipe of peace.

BIG BUSINESS'S WAR
Story of the Chaco

by GEORGE MACGREGOR

From "New Masses" (Communist), New York

THE Chaco war brought to the surface all the forces against democracy and peace in this Western hemisphere. Ancient Spain contributed her share with a heritage of undefined boundaries. Nineteenth-century nationalism brought on the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru and Bolivia, the result of which excluded the last from her Pacific littoral. Bolivian objections to the verdict received their *coup de grâce* in Washington in 1929 when Peru and Chile divided the disputed territory between them. The development of imperialism on a large scale in Bolivia immediately after the World War emphasised the need of an outlet. In 1922 an American banking syndicate floated a $33,000,000 loan for which 65 per cent of the national revenue was pledged. Four years later, 1926, Standard Oil acquired control of some 8,500,000 acres on the Chaco frontier. The same year saw a loan, almost $10,000,000, negotiated with Vickers-Armstrong for war materials, coincident with the employment of the German General Kundt to modernise the army. Bolivian nationalism responded to the vicious impact of the capitalistic struggle. The politicians transferred their programme of hate from Chile to Paraguay.

In that country a similar impulse fanned the flames of nationalism. Argentine firms, dominated by English capital, had acquired cattle lands totalling more than ten million acres in the Chaco claimed by Paraguay. Moreover, Argentina's refusal to Bolivia of permission to build a pipe line from the Santa Cruz fields into Argentina closed the development of these rich pools. Bolivia's attempt, therefore, to secure a port on the Paraguay threatened the English-Argentine monopoly. Progressive

elements in all Latin America denounced these American and British oil interests, seconded by munitions makers, as we have recently learned from the Senate inquiry, for fanning the Chaco dispute into a war. Their belief was fortified, certainly, by the spectacle of two bankrupt countries continuing to purchase huge quantities of war materials.

The war saw the early success of the Paraguayan forces which swept over most of the Chaco and into Eastern Bolivia. However, the latter country extended its line to the Paraguay River. The slaughter went on while the American countries and the League of Nations struggled to resolve the conflict. The Pan-American conference on arbitration failed in 1929. Next Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile began diplomatic manœuvres, but the weakness of Argentina as an interested party destroyed the effort. The League of Nations, overcoming United States opposition to European good offices, thereupon sent a commission into the Chaco late in 1933. After visiting the battlefields and holding conferences, the commission issued a remarkable report that clarified issues but left the war raging. The United States then proposed an arms embargo, but fascist Italy, Japan, and others, horrified at any prospect of peace, refused to join. Negotiations by American powers and the League with the combatants continued. Finally, in June 1935, Argentina and Chile succeeded in getting an armistice, which on January 1st, 1936, matured into a protocol. Left suspended, however, were the territorial claims of the two belligerents.

Within the five countries themselves the war brought political upheavals. In Paraguay the turn was fascist. Franco, with a coterie of military officers, seized power; supporting them were a handful of Paraguayan politicians who held office only by virtue of continued hostilities. In Bolivia the overthrow drove out Captain Roehm, "martyred" by Hitler, who had replaced Kundt. A conservative-liberal government confiscated the holdings of the Standard Oil, cancelled other foreign concessions, and looked for peace.

However, the hopes of the Bolivian liberals and the Western world were dashed by the Justo dictatorship, fascist in nature, in Argentina, closely identified with British imperialism. Through Saavedra Lamas, his foreign secretary, the Chaco solution suffered delay after delay. Particularly notable was the exclusion of the question, through Saavedra's influence, from the agenda of the 1938 Pan-American Conference in Buenos Aires which made notable declarations regarding inter-American

peace and friendship. Moreover, within Paraguay the small camarilla of Franco politicians upheld Saavedra by rejecting the several proposals for settlement which Bolivia, in the interests of inter-American peace, regularly accepted. Ultimately, the defeat of Justo, the deep longing of the Paraguayan and Bolivian peoples for peace, and the steady pressure of the five American states trying to evolve a formula, paved the way for the final peace signed July 21st of this year.

The basis of the agreement is that the major part of the Chaco in which Paraguayan forces had operated goes to Paraguay. However, Paraguay did surrender to Bolivia a significant strip across the north from the Pilcomayo River near Pozo Hondo to a point just north of the mouth of the Negro River on the Paraguay River, the exact points to be fixed by an arbitration commission. Specifically, Paraguay guaranteed to Bolivia right of free transit through its territory to Puerto Casado on the Paraguay River with the right of Bolivia to establish there depots and stores necessary for carrying on her foreign trade. Vitally important and a testimonial to the good-neighbour policy is the clause by which both agree not to engage in war over any present or future difficulty, but to submit differences to arbitral proceedings of the various American pacts and conventions.

A Larger Importance

The settlement of the Chaco war has its larger importance in American affairs. President Ortiz, by using his influence in the direction of peace and therefore democratic evolution, has broken with the Saavedrista tradition of fostering suspicion and intrigue. The emergence of Bolivia as an Atlantic power will reduce her dependence upon feudal-fascist Peru. Moreover, the Atlantic port will bring important civilising influences into the rich Oriente area of Bolivia, not so impenetrable as generally believed. An Indian country, like Mexico, Bolivia has a soil in which democratic and progressive ideas can flourish, already manifested in her confiscation of the Standard Oil holdings. Mexico's recent expropriation of all the foreigners' oil has found wide approval among Bolivians. Contact with the vigorous intellectual life of the La Placa, a toning-down of influences from priest-ridden Peru, and a feeling of brotherly solidarity with Mexico are among the beneficial results of Bolivia's struggle.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Editor welcomes letters from readers, which should be kept as short as possible

AGAINST ANTI-GERMAN POLICY

SIR,—Mr. John Strachey in your September issue criticises the "policy of retreat," and advocates opposition to the dictators even at the expense of a war. While granting the truth of the main line of his argument, I would like to draw attention to certain points in his summary of "what might have been" had the Powers acted otherwise on certain occasions from 1932 onwards.

In the first place, he says that the Manchurian adventure could have been stopped by the application of sanctions and "other suitable measures," and that the Abyssinian campaign could likewise have been stopped. No one doubts it, but we must face the fact that the League (which all good Communists hold should be the sole guide of national policy), expressly precludes the only "other suitable measures"; and that, in 1935, Italy had only to announce that the imposition of any given sanction would be regarded as an act of war to make it "League"ally inapplicable. Perhaps this comes under the category of "spilt milk," but it seems unfair to criticise the British Government for what was due to the inherent weakness of the League itself. Britain had either to pursue that policy of retreat or abandon the policy of the League.

And, in the second place, it seemed likely that the British Government would have supported a revision of this restriction in 1935, and that a unanimous League would oppose the aggressor by force. But, so far as the layman can make out, France held out in order to maintain her Italian alliance against Germany. It also seems that France would not be averse, now, to such a concerted action in the case of Czechoslovakia, since it would there be directed *against Germany*. Inferences are, of course, always dangerous, and perhaps I am being unjust to our old ally, but I am sure that my criticism of them is no more unjust than that which we so often hear against Germany.

The prime failure of post-war European policy has been just this persistent anti-German trend. Germany is always "the bad boy," her every move is distrusted. Mr. Strachey himself refers to her "open determination to rearm" in 1933, but does not mention its connection with the construction of the French Maginot Line—though he hints at it in the phrase "genuine disarmament" which should have accompanied opposition to Germany's move.

Germany's present policy is the inevitable outcome of the anti-German policy of the victor powers. We called the tune, and now we must pay the piper. France's fears are understandable, but they are largely of her own making—the encirclement which now threatens her is what she herself planned for Germany. Would Britain have intervened to save Germany? Should Britain intervene to save France? Three years ago the British public would have willingly given their all to establish the principle that aggression (by anyone) should not be tolerated. Would they now give it as willingly for the limited principle that *German* aggression be suppressed? Mr. Strachey's implication that we should make a stand on the Czech question is likely to be met with the answer that, if the nations found it expedient to put their consciences in their pockets in 1935, they can find it expedient to do the same here, too, especially as

the Czech case is far less convincing than that of Abyssinia.

This much is clear, that even if, at the cost of a world war, Germany is once more "put in a corner," she will never stay there, and to-day's troubles will be repeated until such time as the nations recognise her equality with them in Europe. This is the one policy with regard to Germany which has not yet been tried, and difficult as such a trial must be in the present circumstances, why not make it now instead of later? Britain, France and Germany, working together would be an absolute guarantee of European peace.

A. S.

Glasgow.

PRACTICAL POLITICS

SIR,—I have been reading the WORLD REVIEW with interest, and particularly Mr. Strachey's article. I, like him, have small children and I dread what is in store for them, remembering my own more or less tranquil youth compared to what theirs may be.

I thing paragraphists and theorists write glibly of mistakes, of missed chances, after the event. But give them the responsibility, the grave responsibility of the Government of the day, and, alas, their theories would soon be resolved into nothing but hot air.

Conditions to-day are ephemeral, and what last week seemed the obvious course for the Government this week is entirely the reverse. When you are dealing with rulers of comparatively new States, Hitler, Mussolini and the like, you are dealing with opportunists, and no British Government in recent years has been a match for these gentry.

Until, therefore, we come down to earth and adopt the methods of totalitarian States, we shall be left in the blue, or worse, much worse, and our children who all unconcernedly play with toy aeroplanes and engines of war, as mine do, will suffer what we, perhaps, have never suffered.

There was never so much need of practical politics as there is to-day, and by practical politics I mean giving like for like, intrigue for intrigue—Hitler, Mussolini and the rest are intriguers waiting for the cat to jump.

It's all very well talking about the League of Nations and other altruistic methods. Altruism in every walk of life is as dead as mutton, and as Europe is made up of a heterogeneous mass all striving for something, no round table talk which does not give them what they want will serve.

We have all we want and more; other nations have not, and until they get a modicum of this, the strife will go on.

G. DRUMMOND.

London, W.1.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE'S CAR

SIR,—In the article "The German People's Car" in your September number there is a mistake which I would like to point out. I do this all the more readily as your readers are really not accustomed to finding mistakes in this excellent magazine.

You write, in converting the German reckoning into English, that the car will do "approximately 27 miles to the gallon." In reality this should be "approximately 45 miles to the gallon."

You will agree that this gives a reader quite a different conception of the economy of the car. One must admit that the car is extraordinarily cheap to maintain, and will be really a People's Car, when one remembers (*a*) that insurance is contained in the weekly instalment payments; (*b*) that no tax is payable; and (*c*) that in all probability petrol for the People's Car will not cost even half as much as for other cars. It should not cost more than about £12 a

year for a man who here in England, for example, would reckon £1 a week for his car.

Pastor H. Diehl.
German Evangelical Seaman's Mission, South Shields.

THE WALRUS—AN APPEAL

SIR,—I wonder if you could help me in the following matter :

Very often in English writings I find allusions to a certain *Walrus* and a *Carpenter*. The quotations I have read have made me wish most fervently to know more about these two, but it has been impossible for me to trace the author, the publisher or even the right title of the poem. I should be immensely grateful if you could indicate me how to get hold of a copy—or if this is not possible, please, just a word of enlightenment.

B. K.
Stockholm.

DAWN

(A memory of the Somme, September, 1916).

"Heaviness may endure for the night, but joy cometh in the morning"

Came a sudden cold, grey twilight,
Came a silence of foreboding,
And the flickering starlight faded,
And the Very lights died smouldering.

With a rustle through the grasses,
Came the fresh cool air of morning
And the sleepers turned and shuddered
At this herald of day's dawning.

Came the welcome warmth of sunshine,
Came the sound of guns in action,
Came the sweet warm scent of hayfields,
Came the breath of putrefaction.

September, 1938 G.V.O.

We modestly lay claim that—

We may be behind with the news, but we are well ahead with facts and warnings. As far back as September 1936, under the heading: "Thunderclouds Over Bohemia" we published a full statement of Sudeten German grievances by Konrad Henlein. Some facts contained in this have, we believe, even now not appeared in the general press.

THE POLISH CLAIM AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Poland's claim to Teschen will be very much "in the news" in the next few weeks. The full story of the importance of this rich mining area, how it was seized by Czechoslovakia in 1919, and the subsequent history of the dispute, were told in "WORLD REVIEW" for July 1938. Copies of this issue are still available.

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INTERNATIONAL BOOKSHELF

The Editor reminds his readers that he does not necessarily share the opinions expressed by reviewers in this section. But this is a free country and knows no censorship

NAVY'S PART IN CURRENT HISTORY

THE GREY DIPLOMATISTS. By Lt.-Comdr. Kenneth Edwards, R.N. *Rich & Cowan.* 15*s.*

Reviewed by GEORGE MARTELLI

Taking as his text Nelson's saying that "a fleet of British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe," Commander Edwards tells the story of the Royal Navy's activities from 1922 down to the end of 1937. To be strictly accurate, it is the part played by the Navy in international events affecting the Mediterranean, and the story is almost exclusively confined to that sea. Whether this is so by design or accident is not made clear, but it is equally significant in either case. At Dartmouth and Greenwich, where I once sat in the same class-room with Kenneth Edwards, we were taught by that fine historian, Professor Geoffrey Callendar, that Britain's influence in the councils of Europe had consistently waxed and waned with the rise and fall of its sea power in the Mediterranean. I believe this is truer to-day than ever, and it is highly satisfactory, considering the uselessness of so much that we learn at school, to find the Commander confirming out of his own experience and observation what was preached to the sub-lieutenant.

Commander Edwards has the double advantage of writing both as a naval officer and a journalist. As a naval officer he knows what it means when a ship has to be hurriedly commissioned for an emergency, a fleet concentrated for a demonstration, or a naval base improvised against threat of attack. He knows what is possible and what is not. He can appraise the value of different arms and has seen the forces at work which give policy—and war, he reminds us, is but a "continuation of policy by other means" —the power to be effective or not. As a journalist, on the other hand, he has followed the diplomatic action of which the "Grey Diplomatists" are the ultimate instrument. He is in the rare position of knowing both why and how the machine works, on which the existence of all of us depends.

His story starts at Smyrna, where the author was serving in one of the ships which went to the rescue of the population after the débâcle of the Greek Army. He saw refugees throw themselves into the water to escape the fury of the victorious Turks, and took part in one of those purely humanitarian operations which have come to be almost routine work for the Navy. From there the scene switches to Corfu, where Mussolini was showing his mailed fist for the first time. Follows the long period of what the author terms "retrogression," a period of disarmament, of declining morale, and of diminishing British influence

as Italy's naval power increases .There are excellent chapters on the Anglo-Italian crisis of 1935, in which Commander Edwards lifts some of the veil which cloaked our unpreparedness at that time.

From evil, however, came forth good. The discovery that our predominating position could be challenged shocked the nation into action, and made possible the effort of rearmament whose fruits we are beginning to see. "The end of the Mediterranean crisis saw a very different state of affairs," writes Commander Edwards. "In every way the power and prestige of the Royal Navy was on the up-grade. The emergency had demonstrated once again the truth of Bacon's words: 'He that commandeth the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.'"

The last part of the book describes the action of the Navy in Spanish waters, the piracy campaign, the Nyon conference, and the many issues raised by non-intervention. In his concluding chapter the author discusses the future in the Mediterranean and ends on a plea for Anglo-Italian friendship.

HARMLESS SPOOK OR WORLD MENACE?

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

By F. Borkenau. *Faber.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by DOUGLAS REED

Dr. Borkenau's industry is great. First, *The Spanish Cockpit,* then *Austria and After,* both of which I enjoyed, and now *The Communist International.*

This book begins with the statement: "Some believe that the Communist International will save the world; others, that it is the shape of the devil in our present time; some, and among them the author of this book, that it is neither the

Sweden: Ancient and Modern

edited by ROLF GRAUERS

Foreword by Vernon Bartlett

This attractively produced book is both a concise history of Sweden and a practical guide to its attractions. Present-day conditions in this land of many wonders are shown against a background of centuries of development. The story throughout is supplemented by a sketch of the country's scenic beauty and is illustrated with photographs, maps and diagrams.

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"Step by step Messrs. Ekins and Wright trace this long campaign of plunder that Japan has waged upon China now rousing itself from a supine inaction. They are just authors, and as such impartial, and I cannot remember having read a more detailed and accurate portrait of Chiang Kai-Shek, upon whom, for good or ill the destiny of China now rests."

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one nor the other, but simply a failure." Dr. Borkenau was himself a member of a foreign Communist Party affiliated to the Comintern—the German Communist Party—from 1921 to 1929, so that his view commands respect. For my part I think it is the right one; in my experience in many countries of Europe I have found the foreign children of the Comintern increasingly ineffective, and valuable, out of all proportion to their strength, to the friends of oppression and reaction in these countries—for what should we do without our Reds?

Starting from this conviction, Dr. Borkenau comes, at the end of his book, to the conclusion that, since the vital thing for Russia is to be on the same side as the democratic countries in any major international war, this doubtful asset, the Comintern, should be discarded, the Russian Revolution limited to a domestic process, the faded dream of the world revolution abandoned. As long as the Comintern exists people in the West will distrust Russia; ineffective though it is, it arouses anxieties among large numbers of people in other countries because of the aims it originally proclaimed; and its dissolution, and Russia's scrupulous abstention from interference abroad, would enable Russia to be treated on an equal footing with those democratic countries "whose ideals it professes to share."

Well, there you have it. I remember that when Anthony Eden went to Moscow and saw Stalin a communiqué was issued stating that there was "no conflict of interests on any major issue of international policy." That is the fact. Russia wants nothing that England has; some other countries do. But that communiqué, and Litvinoff's toast to King George, and the Union Jacks at Moscow Station, and the British National Anthem in the Moscow Opera, roused angry cries from many parts of England. "What about Communist propaganda?" or in other words, "What about the Comintern?" The spook of the Comintern has continued, as Dr. Borkenau says, to scarify opinion in other countries and make many people in them antagonistic to the thought of co-operation with Russia. When I was in Moscow I asked Litvinoff, "What about Communist propaganda?" and he answered that Communist propaganda was a phrase used by people who wanted bad relations with Russia. Nevertheless, as Dr. Borkenau argues, the Comintern has a high nuisance value. Without it, he seems to imply, the European line-up would be far easier, there would be nothing to prevent the reconstitution of the Anglo-Franco-Russian combination, built to contain Germany, and all would be well. Would it? Well, perhaps it would.

Between the beginning and end of his book Dr. Borkenau has packed a mass of information about the development of the Communist Parties outside Russia. This is so long and so full of detail that it tends to obscure his main argument, described above, but it is most useful for students of these things and others interested in them , who wish to be able at a moment's notice to dip into a concise summary of the Bela Kun interlude in Hungary, the struggle against Bulgarian Fascism of our old friend Georghi Dimitrov of the Reichstag Fire, the collapse of German Comunism, the development of Communism in China and France and Spain, the convulsive efforts of Moscow Headquarters to understand and direct the kindred movements abroad.

Dr. Borkenau knows a great deal from personal experience, and his knowledge is evidently supplemented by a large library or a carefully maintained collection of press cuttings. His book, thus, is full of useful information, all of which, as far as I could judge, is accurate. As to that conclusion—well, we shall see.

At the moment it is difficult to imagine Moscow recanting, and depositing the corpse of the Comintern as a sacrifice on the altar of democracy. But who knows?

SPAIN AND THE WRITER

DAYS OF HOPE. By André Malraux. *Routledge.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

SOME STILL LIVE. By F. G. Tinker. *Lovat Dickson.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by PHILIP JORDAN

To anyone acquainted with what little literature of our time deserves to be called 'significant,' the name of André Malraux is familiar. And rightly so. M. Malraux is one of the few men of our age who concern themselves with those problems whose solution is of the highest importance to us all. He knows that unless he enjoys freedom in which to think and liberty in which to express himself, the writer will never amount to a row of beans; and that unless the writer amounts to a row of beans the literature of our age will be left to the guardianship of such talents as our major best sellers now possess; and will thus perish from the earth as soon as one generation of old ladies succeeds another.

I remain unconvinced, however, that it is the first duty of all writers to come down out of the Ivory Tower; for it is my conviction that many a promising career has been wasted because the harsh air of the world was too strong for it and killed whatever imaginative and creative intelligence those careers showed, leaving in its place only the husk of exact observation. Such men should have remained in their intellectual stratosphere. But not M. Malraux.

If any writer of our time has justified that pernicious doctrine of descent it is he. So far from stifling his creative power, the air of the world arena has strengthened it until it now flourishes in the splendour of its maturity.

Not every wind that blows has improved it. Like all good writers, Malraux has written bad books; but—which is unlikely—if any of the literature of our generation survives, *La Condition Humaine,* will be among the first to cause another generation to remember our own with respect. English readers were given the book under the silly and wholly inappropriate title of *Storm in Shanghai*; and those who read it will not have forgotten it.

A worthy successor now arrives, *Days of Hope,* quite admirably translated. Once more it tells the most important story of our age: man's struggle, his open-eyed struggle, against the powers of darkness. Good and evil have always been the majestic characters of those who would create literature rather than write books. And good and evil are the characters in this imaginative re-creation

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of the Spanish civil war, in which M. Malraux was himself a distinguished pilot. Here, between horizons as wide as Spain itself, is a tale that embraces all mankind; but if you prefer to read the book, not as an allegory, merely as a novel, you will still be startled. History and fiction lie down together and have produced between them a book as exciting as it is noble.

Mr. Tinker deserves a better fate than to be linked in the same review with M. Malraux, for Mr. Tinker is not a writer and, I am sure, does not profess to be one. Nevertheless, he has produced an honest and exciting book about his experiences as a pilot in the service of the Spanish Government. He was a good pilot and is an honest reporter; and those who would know something of the difficulties with which the Government had to contend in the early days of the war had better read it. He will probably come to the conclusion that we should be better and happier had the aeroplane never been invented. I think he would be right.

UNHOLY MUDDLE

POOR KNIGHT'S SADDLE.

By Douglas V. Duff. *Jenkins.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by C. F. O. Clarke

Over eight hundred years ago the Association of the Poor Knights of Christ was formed to police the Holy Land and guarantee the safety of its highways. To-day their place has been taken by the British administration. This book is an attempt to examine how far Britain has proved a worthy successor to the mediæval constabulary; its author was himself for ten years a member of the Palestine Police.

The book mainly consists of a series of conversations with people drawn from every section of the Jewish and Arab communities, as well as with British officials. The variety of types living cheek by jowl in this small territory, less than the size of Wales, is in itself enough to make the difficulties of government intelligible. On each side there are violent partisans, for whom the words "reconciliation" and "compromise" have no meaning. The author himself appears to favour the principle of partition, although, locally, the doubts about how it can be carried out seem only equalled by the wealth of criticism it has aroused. In Mr. Duff's view it is a confession of failure on the part of the British Government that no other solution should offer itself.

One of the chief defects in the British rule appears to have been the lack of first-class administrators. From this account, officials are far more concerned with avoiding black marks from above than with showing firmness and initiative. For this the home Government is, in the last resort, responsible; it has failed to appreciate the difficulty of the task it set itself until too late; and now, if there is one point on which the majority in Palestine are united, it is dislike for a regime that cannot win respect. The British are sensitive about their colonial tradition; but Palestine can give them little cause for satisfaction so long as an official there can air the following views on Partition:

"It may answer long enough for Britain to crawl out of this mess we have made, without losing face, and rousing the dear old British public to round upon the professional politicians and the higher lights of the Civil Service at home, the birds who sit at ease in armchairs above Whitehall and tell us to do things no human being could perform."

By bringing the reader into touch with the day-to-day life of Palestine, by taking him through town and village and letting him hear the views of priest and labourer, merchant and politician,

Mr. Duff has given him a real opportunity to understand a situation which newspaper reports oversimplify. Historical digressions and touches of landscape provide the tale with a vivid and interesting background.

THE MELTING POT

AMERICANS ALL. By William Seabrook. *Harrap.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by M. McDougall

Mr. Seabrook's book is a lively piece of reporting, full of authentic pictures of such different types of people as Scandinavian farmers in the Northwest, Polish miners in Pennsylvania, German brewers in St. Louis and Italian newspaper owners in New York, members of the "foreign language groups" he has investigated all over the United States. (Only European races are dealt with; there is no mention of the Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Mexicans, Red Indians and Negroes whose assimiliation into American society is so much more difficult.) It is obvious that Mr. Seabrook has the faculty of getting on well with people and he makes them seem real to us, principally by telling us exactly what they said and did.

The main moral he draws from his experiences seems to be that though men be emigrants or the sons of emigrants, they are none the less good and loyal Americans. He glorifies the symbol of the melting pot and tells us how the process of Americanisation is being accelerated. And it is true that while describing all his different groups he is also giving a good picture of Americans in general, their energy, friendliness and optimism. At the same time he is most interesting when he reveals how many national differences still persist.

A corollary to his main conclusion about the patriotism of all recently naturalised Americans is his belief in the

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extreme rarity among them, or indeed among any other Americans, of what he calls "subversiveness" and "Red Radicalism." How much his estimates are influenced by the fact that he himself is "an old-fashioned reactionary Ogden Mills Tory black Republican" it would be hard to say.

He is better at describing his experiences than at drawing conclusions from them. His generalisations are too apt to be remarks like this: "The Poles in their quiet way are quite interested in sex, but with less *frou-frou* than the French, though they are sometimes compared to them"; or this, "if you look at a map you can understand immediately why the French and Swiss are petty, and the insular British repressed about everything except empire-building."

SOVIET BLURB AND FACTS

FROM TSARDOM TO THE STALIN CONSTITUTION. By W. P. Coates and Zelda Coates. *Allen and Unwin.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

SOVIET TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION. By L. F. Hubbard. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by R. H. S. Crossman

It is strange what little relation there is between the price of a book and its value. Only 2s. 6d. separates the two books on our list, and yet one is a mere brochure, the other a serious study. Mr. and Mrs. Coates have performed the function of a Public Relations Officer, and the only value of "From Tsardom to the Stalin Constitution" is that it tells you just exactly what the Communist publicity experts want you to know. It is, in brief, a "blurb."

In their outline history of Russia, which, despite the title, occupies only half the book, it is interesting to notice that Trotsky is not mentioned in relation to the organisation of the Red Army, that Stalin is associated with Lenin from 1917 on as the acknowledged leader and that the famine of 1932 is discreetly overlooked. The second half of the book consists of description of the accomplishments of the regime culled mostly from Soviet newspapers. As all figures for production, wages, etc., are given in roubles, no analysis is possible of the real progress achieved. Let me make it quite clear that I have no objection to advertising methods as such. Only I feel that the price charged is excessive.

Mr. Hubbard has written an invaluable book for those who want to understand how a planned economy really works. I felt after reading it that I understood for the first time the gigantic task of the Soviet Administrators. Though Mr. Hubbard is highly critical of the regime, he restored to me a lot of the appreciation of Communist achievement which Mr. and Mrs. Coates had extinguished. After a short historical introduction, he deals briefly and incisively with retail trade, agricultural marketing, the price-system, real wages, and the condition of the peasants. His last two chapters are concerned with social and class problems.

It is a relief to get away from statistical records to a business-like account of the actual administration of the Soviet economic machine. I was particularly interested in his description of retail trade, which shows that, though there is still planning of staple necessities, there is increasingly a free market for luxury goods. It is also illuminating to learn that prices are sometimes varied for reasons of high politics and that by this means a sort of tariff protection has been produced for certain agricultural areas. But perhaps the most useful chapter of all is that on nominal and real wages, the first lucid analysis I have read of this thorny problem.

My only criticism of Mr. Hubbard is that he retains a queerly idealistic picture of capitalism, which makes him unduly pessimistic about planning. I quote one sentence without comment.

> "It seems extremely probable that if capitalist conditions governed employment in Russia, that is to say, if every worker was entitled to a fair living wage and no employment enterprise was allowed to pay sweating wages, there would be a considerable volume of unemployment."

In spite of such surprising statements, *Soviet Trade and Distribution* is an invaluable piece of research.

A VARIED LIFE

I LOOK BACK SEVENTY YEARS. By E. H. Lacon Watson. *Eyre & Spottiswoode.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Reviewed by FREDERIC WHYTE

IN this extremely pleasant, leisurely, mellow book Mr. Lacon Watson, by turn schoolmaster, journalist, publisher, novelist, and war-correspondent, tells us the story of his life and friendships. Admirers and friends of that gifted little man of letters and ardent Irish patriot, Lionel Johnson, will be much interested in the author's vivid portrait of him at Winchester. At Cambridge Mr. Lacon Watson was an energetic rowing man. After Cambridge came schoolmastering; then a period of bachelor life in London, at Staple Inn, as a free-lance contributor to the press; and the first literary effort to which he looked back with any satisfaction, "The Unconscious Humorist and Other Essays." At Staple Inn he became intimate with Festing Jones who on special occasions conceded to him glimpses of Samuel Butler.

Most of Mr. Lacon Watson's friendships date from the founding of the Author's Club by Sir Walter Besant, Besant himself heading the list. Conspicuous among the many others have been Mr. Morley Roberts and Mr. H. A. Vachell. Of Mr. Vachell's *Brothers* he writes: '*Brothers* placed him at once in the front rank of living novelists. . . . I could not entirely believe him when he told my wife that the character of Mark Samphire was taken from me'; the only resemblance he can see between himself and that character is that they both stammer. And so the narrative proceeds most interestingly down to the time of the Great War, when, after vain efforts to secure a commission in the Army ("too old at fifty," though a good many of his contemporaries succeeded), he found useful occupation first with the Postal Censorship, then in Reuter's Editorial Department, of whose methods he gives particulars which will be quite new to most people. Later chapters in which he records his experience as a Reuter's Special on the Italian Front form one of the most outstanding sections of a really admirable book.

POTTED INFORMATION

WHAT'S WHAT AND WHO'S WHO IN SOME WORLD AFFAIRS. By J. A. Sinclair Pooley. *Bale, Sons and Curnow.* 5*s.*

"I KNOW how easy it is to drop into a jargon which saves the writer trouble but puzzles the reader," says Mr. Vernon Bartlett in his foreword to this little handbook. "What are the Oslo Group and the Little Entente? When did Herr Hitler wipe out the last inequality clause of the Versailles Treaty? Who are the Iron Guards? What is the task of the Fascist Grand Council?—such questions are always cropping up to frighten the average citizen who cannot find time to specialise in foreign affairs, but who yet realises more and more their vast and increasing importance to him and his children." Mr. Sinclair Pooley's little book supplies the answers in brief.

THE WORLD OF FINANCE

BACK FROM THE BRINK

by "RAPIER"

As I correct these lines, the news comes through that the British and French have adopted a plan for the solution of the Sudeten problem, involving a re-drawing of the Czech frontier. At first sight this appeared like complete capitulation to Hitler's demand, but it is understood that it will be made part of a general settlement in order to achieve appeasement along the lines on which Mr. Chamberlain has been working ever since he became Premier. The announcement that the Prime Minister was "proceeding Hitlerwards" (to use the phraseology in which I cabled this news) followed by the report of the plan, caused relief in the City, and brought some recovery from the very low levels to which fear of imminent war had sent prices during the preceding week.

The European political crisis which developed in August and increased in intensity in September brought business in financial and commodity markets almost to a standstill. The one exception was the foreign exchange and bullion markets, where nervous Continental operators fled both from their own currencies and from sterling into gold and dollars. But in mid-September fear of the imminence of war made operators prefer cash to gold. In the event of war it might be impossible to effect insurance of gold shipments to New York which would prevent arbitrage. Hoarders, therefore, began to dispose of their gold and bought dollars with the proceeds. In normal times by shipping gold to New York they can get dollars shortly after arrival when the gold is sold to the American Treasury. There has also been a slight increase in money rates which, though still small, presages what might have happened should war have broken out.

In these circumstances many people in the City were asking how long the world is going to be held to ransom by perpetual political crises and whether it would not be best once for all to have a clear-cut solution so that the world can get on with its ordinary business without these recurrent upsets. The economic situation of the world is serious enough without the added complication of political crises. Instability of currencies, quotas, tariffs, subsidies and foreign exchange restrictions continue to hamper international trade. Armaments are piling up at an ever increasing rate and lowering the standard of living for this generation and the next. The doctrine of self-sufficiency permeates the economy of many great nations and further restricts the standard of living throughout the world. But until we get some political appeasement it appears impossible to tackle economic problems. No country is really self-sufficient, except perhaps a South Sea Island, and the efforts of

Germany, Italy and Japan to attain a measure of self-sufficiency are only partially successful. Germany has made the greatest progress in this direction but the fact that her imports still amount to over 4,000 million marks worth a year proves that she is still dependent upon foreign trade for many essentials. Even on a peace basis, Germany cannot supply its needs of foodstuffs, iron ore and oil, especially heavy oils. And this despite the Goering Four Year Plan.

German "Bloodless Invasion"

To remedy these defects, Germany has been pursuing a policy of barter trade, particularly with the Balkans, by exchanging manufactured goods for raw materials such as wheat and oil. With the dwindling of the world's markets the Balkans have been forced to find an outlet for their surplus products and though such methods as those employed by Germany are unsatisfactory to the Balkans they have but little option. In a recent book by Dr. Einzig, this German policy is stigmatised as "Bloodless Invasion" and Britain is urged to adopt counter measures. As is well known, Britain has already done something to strengthen its position with Turkey by the grant of a credit of £16,000,000 and is now negotiating with Roumania to arrange export credits on similar lines. An agreement has also been made with Roumania by which a British firm is to import 400,000 tons of Roumanian wheat. This is not an outright purchase, as the wheat will remain in the ownership of the Roumanian authorities until sold in the open market at prevailing prices. It will be shipped to Britain over the next nine months and amounts to approximately one-third of Roumania's exportable surplus for this crop year. Terms of payment provide for advances to Roumanian authorities against wheat arriving and the sterling will be paid as to 40%

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into the Anglo-Roumanian clearing account and 40% to the additional purchase of British goods by Roumania. The balance of 20% sterling will be at Roumania's free disposal. The interest of the transaction is that it does offer a prospect of improving the position of the clearing account and does not therefore, as so many German transactions do, lead to further frozen credits.

Drawbacks To Political Trade

The difficulty of Britain's increasing its trade with the Balkans is that with our protected market here and our Imperial preference, and possibly new arrangements with the United States under a trade treaty in the near future, the scope for taking any largely increased amounts of Balkan produce appears very limited. Germany has no such arrangements for importing raw materials and with its existing shortage of foreign exchange naturally finds barter trade a way out of its difficulties. In the old days France was one of the best markets for Balkan produce, but with its wheat subsidies and many restrictions on imports it is no longer an important market. It was the French, however, who suggested at the conference in London which followed the occupation of Austria by Germany, that credits should be given to the Balkan countries. So far, it would seem that Britain is to provide these credits, though of course, in the heighday of the "Little Entente," France provided credits for armaments supplied from France's arsenals. The whole question is one of great difficulty, for no one wishes to increase the already large amount of existing frozen credits, and to provide credits without marketing facilities seems only half a solution. In any case, international trade based upon competing political interests, is unlikely to bring that economic appeasement for which the world is waiting and watching.

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DIARY OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS: AUGUST 15—SEPT. 14

CZECHS AND NAZIS

THE direct negotiations between Dr. Hodza and the Sudeten leaders reached a deadlock (August 17th), when the latter rejected the Government's proposals based on the constitution of four provinces and maintained their memorandum of June 7th (which included the claim for territorial autonomy). About August 25th, owing to Lord Runciman's mediation, the Government formulated a new scheme, envisaging a system of twenty-seven departments, some of which would be wholly German. But the signs were unfavourable for compromise. In Germany a partial mobilisation had been carried out, vast manœuvres were organised under war conditions, involving the retention of 1,000,000 men under arms, while work was intensified, with conscript labour, on the Western ("Siegfried") defence lines. The chancelleries in Belgrade, Budapest and Moscow and the French Air Chief, General Vuillemin, a guest at the German manœuvres, had been sounded as to their countries' attitude should Germany intervene. The Sudeten leaders had been assured by the Reich of "every support" if a solution were long delayed, and had been authorised by some of their leaders to use arms for self-defence against Marxist terrorists. The German Press became more menacing, representing the Sudetens as cruelly oppressed and magnifying every incident. These developments caused no less grave concern in Germany than abroad. Securities fell steeply on the Berlin Bourse.

In Paris and London the implied threat of force was held unjustified, in view of the conciliatory attitude of the Prague Government. On August 27th, Sir J. Simon reaffirmed Mr. Chamberlain's warning of March 24th that England might become involved if a war broke out. Sir N. Henderson was recalled from Berlin to confer with the Cabinet, which met on August 30th and approved steps which might be suitable in given circumstances.

Sir J. Simon's speech produced a momentary lull during which Herr Henlein, at Lord Runciman's suggestion, conferred with Herr Hitler, who approved of his continuing negotiations. On the same day, however, the Sudeten leaders rejected the main part of the Government's scheme, and, on September 4th, still averse to compromise, they declared that the only solution lay in the prompt realisation of the—still undefined—"8 points" of Herr Henlein's Carlsbad speech (April 24th) and, as some of their spokesmen announced, in a reorientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy—a demand which had also figured in the Carlsbad speech. Herr Henlein now summoned a Nazi rally—illegal in Czechoslovakia—to meet at Aussig on October 15th.

The Prague Government, yielding once again to Lord Runciman's counsel, formulated a "final" offer (September 5th), which went far to meet the "8 points" and was considered in Paris and London as a reasonable basis.

After renewed mediation by Lord Runciman the Sudeten leaders accepted these proposals as a basis, but later in the day broke off discussions on the ground of police violence offered to a deputy in some rioting at Morava-Ostrava. The situation was all the more tense owing to the political excitement aroused in the Reich by the Press campaign and to the imminence of Herr Hitler's closing speech at Nüremberg. The French and British governments were concerned to dispel any illusion that a conflict, resulting from a *coup de force,* could be localised. It was announced in Paris (September 5th) that, in view of the increase of German effectives on the Rhine frontier, certain reservists had been called up and the Maginot Line fully

manned; naval forces were concentrated at Brest and Toulon; M. Bonnet, (September 5th) reiterated that France would fulfil her pledges. The British Admiralty also announced precautionary measures; the Fleet was already concentrating in the North Sea for manœuvres. The implications of Sir J. Simon's speech were made clear by Sir N. Henderson to the Nazi chiefs at Nüremberg. Lord Halifax postponed his journey to Geneva (where the 19th Assembly was to meet on September 12th). The United States' sympathy with the efforts of the "peace-loving nations" was manifested in speeches by Mr. Hull (August 16th) and President Roosevelt (August 18th); the President remained near Washington during the crisis ready to summon Congress if war broke out; his ambassador in France, Mr. Bullitt, stated (September 5th) that no one could say if the United States would not be drawn into a European war. An American Atlantic squadron was provisionally organised.

The Italian Foreign Office organ approved (September 8th) the principles of the "8 points," but deprecated demands for a plebiscite or a separatist solution.

On September 9th it was announced that the Sudeten leaders would resume discussion on the Prague Government's plan. On September 11th, the British Government stated in a communiqué to the Press its conviction that its warnings had reached Herr Hitler, and repeated its belief in the necessity of a peaceful settlement.

Herr Hitler's speech at the close of the Nazi rally (September 12th) was a scarcely veiled ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. He accused Dr. Benes of playing with concessions and of fabricating the legend of Germany's intended aggression on May 21st, and of her retreat before England and France. Germany, he said, would not submit to such an indignity a second time. He stirred the feelings of his audience by depicting the plight of the Sudetens, subjected to "shameless ill-treatment" and "hunted like wild beasts"; but, he said, they were not defenceless or deserted. Recalling his words of February 22nd (that Germany would not tolerate the continued oppression of 3½ million Germans beyond the frontier) he demanded the right of self-determination for the Sudetens, and declared that there must be *"an understanding one way or another."* Addressing himself indirectly to foreign Powers he claimed that Germany had made greater sacrifices for peace than any nation and had accepted "a number of frontiers" as final; but there was always a united front against Germany. In his proclamation on September 6th he had already announced that Germany was invulnerable to a blockade. He now described the impregnable western fortifications, behind which, he declared, stood the "German people in arms."

The speech was immediately followed by an organised outbreak of incidents in the Sudeten districts, in some of which the Government declared martial law. Herr Henlein thereupon demanded the withdrawal of these measures within six hours, failing which his party would "not be responsible for future developments." The Government not complying, serious affrays followed in many towns. The Sudeten leaders declared (September 13th) that the "8 points" no longer formed a basis for negotiations.

On September 14th Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed, offering to meet Herr Hitler next day, "with a view to finding a peaceful solution." Herr Hitler replied that he was "very ready"; Berchtesgaden was appointed as the place of meeting.

SPAIN

On August 18th the Republican Government was re-constructed with a view to militarising industries and intensifying efforts.

On the Ebro front, after a month's fighting, the Nationalists had relieved the pressure on Gandesa, but the Republicans, in face of incessant attacks, retained their foothold on the right bank of the Ebro.

General Franco's reply (published August 22nd) to the Non-Intervention Committee's compromise plan of July 5th rejected "proportionate evacuation," on

the ground that a fair census of the volunteers was impossible, and that nationals of states not represented on the Committee would not be withdrawn. It also rejected the surveillance of ports by observers and air-patrols, on grounds of sovereignty and military exigencies. On the other hand it proposed the withdrawal of 10,000 volunteers on each side and the establishment of two "safety ports" in Catalonia and Levante for neutral merchant ships; but it demanded the unconditional closing of land frontiers and the immediate grant of unrestricted belligerent rights, without awaiting the withdrawal of the volunteers. In London the reply was regarded as a virtual refusal, making a new line of approach necessary if the Non-Intervention policy were not to be discarded. Russia at once announced that she would make no further concessions. The Barcelona Government assured Great Britain (August 25th) of its readiness to apply the Plan for withdrawal of volunteers—subject to reciprocity—to persons of all non-Spanish nationalities.

The British Chargé d'Affairs at Rome again drew attention (August 18th, 21st) to reports of fresh Italian intervention in Spain, especially during the Ebro battle in July, and to the embarrassment thus caused to the French Government, which continued, in face of internal pressure, to close the Pyreneean frontier. Count Ciano, while not denying the reports, observed that no proofs were adduced, and indicated that supplies or men sent to Spain merely sufficed to replace wastage; Italy, he said, would not withdraw her men till other countries did so. The Italian Press at the same time made counter-charges—which were denied in France—of renewed transit of men and material over the French frontier. It also gave prominence to the achievements of the "Legionary air force of the Balearics" during the Ebro fighting.

The British Committee of experts for investigating air attacks visited Republican Spain (August 18th) at the Spanish government's request. Its report, published on September 1st, showed that in certain cases (cf. Torrevieja, August 25th) the civil population had been deliberately attacked.

HUNGARY AND HER NEIGHBOURS

Admiral Horthy, regent of Hungary, and accompanied by his chief Ministers was received at Kiel by Herr Hitler with Royal honours (August 22nd). The speeches addressed to him stressed the historic comradeship of Germans and Magyars in resisting attack from the East. The Regent, for his part, proclaimed the friendship Hungary, Germany and Italy and their common will "for a just peace," but, so far as known, he avoided any definite commitments to the "Axis." Simultaneously with his visit the Little Entente Conference (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia) was meeting at Bled to seek improved relations with Hungary. The path had been opened by the publication in Rumania (August 4th) of a statute giving equal rights to all nationalities. On August 23rd agreements were initialled,

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in the first part of which the three states unconditionally acquiesced in Hungary's rearmament, already unilaterally undertaken. The second part, in which the parties promised to refrain mutually from the use of force, was stated by the Hungarian Foreign Minister to be contingent upon the settlement of the minorities question after the nationalities question had been regulated in Czechoslovakia—where Hungary was demanding greater concessions than in the other two states. When it is settled, the agreements can take form as bilateral treaties between Hungary and the individual states. The communiqué issued by the Little Entente hoped for their early conclusion "in the interests of the Danube region as a whole."

The British, French and Rumanian governments agreed (August 18th) that the European Commission of the Danube should cede to Rumania the control of Danube navigation between Braila and the Black Sea and other powers which Rumania claimed to exercise as the sovereign state, subject to decision by an arbitral tribunal in case of disputes concerning navigation regulations.

THE FAR EAST

The Japanese offensive against Hankow was developed in August on a wide semicircle, from Juichang, south of the Yangtse, which fell about August 26th, to Tangkwan in the elbow of the Yellow River. The fall of Hankow being expected to end major operations the next actual problem was the "re-construction of China." Prince Konoye's message to Italy (August 19th) said that after the overthrow of General Chiang Kai-shek China must decide whether to form a single state or a federation. The War Minister indicated (August 29th) that the amalgamation of the Peking and Nanking governments was now contemplated.

The Japanese ambassador in Paris (August 15th) described the traffic in arms via Indo-China and the Franco-Soviet Pact as "black spots" in Franco-Japanese relations. Fears were expressed in Japan lest General Chiang Kai-shek should base himself on Yunanfu, in touch with French territory, when driven from Hankow, which was now isolated from Hongkong owing to the activities of the Japanese aircraft.

After the Russo-Japanese clash in July, there was a move in Tokyo for improved Anglo-Japanese relations, in spite of the dislike of the nationalists for any concessions to England. The Press was informed (August 22nd) that Japan was not rejecting England's demands, and that her policy was to prevail on other Powers to withdraw their countenance from General Chiang Kai-shek. The *Asahi* suggest (August 16th) that British claims might obtain speedier satisfaction if England ceased to support China.

The United States protested to Japan (August 26th) against the action of Japanese aircraft which forced down a Chinese-American air liner near Canton (August 24th) and machine-gunned the passengers. The Japanese reply (August 31st) maintained that the action was consistent with the laws of war, and that the United Staes had no standing, as the air-liner was Chinese-owned. The Japanese official spokesman (August 26th), discussing a British protest against the suppression of Press messages concerning the same incident, maintained Japan's right to censor all non-official cables.

MEXICO AND THE U.S.A.

In view of the dangerous precedent in inter-American relations created by the Mexican Government's denial (August 3rd) of any obligation under international law to give prompt compensation for the seizure of foreign property, the United States renewed in more emphatic terms (August 23rd) its proposal for arbitration on the expropriation of the American-owned farm lands. President Cardenas, in a speech to Congress and a Note (September 4th) rejected the conditions that no such seizures should take place pending a settlement and that a fund should be built up to provide compensation, affirming Mexico's right to "expropriate all lands that may be necessary," undeterred by foreign pressure.

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